Critical Moral Thinking in a Machine Age

Will artificial decision-making support ( dms ) erode human capacity for moral decision-making and human ability to think critically about morality? The question is empirical, but also ethical. To provide a framework for investigating human morality vis-à-vis dms , I will examine the self-proclaimed Kantian utilitarian Richard M. Hare’s two-level theory of critical and intuitive moral thinking. Hare’s proposition may offer a constructive approach to probe the consequences of dms for human moral thinking. I consider Hare’s notion of an archangel and a fanatic as moral agents. An amoralist approach is briefly examined. I conclude that dms will not leave humans without moral agency, although it may lure human beings into evading responsibility by leaving high-stake moral decisions to machines. Hopefully, critical moral thinking will retain moral autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence.