Trade-offs between accountability and discretion in job performance: findings from a survey study in a Chinese regulatory context

Governments increasingly rely on accountability mechanisms and discretion to enhance the performance of street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). Yet, the interaction between these two governance tools remains contested. This study investigates how SLBs' felt accountability and perceived discretion influence both in-role and extra-role performance, focusing on a sample of 490 regulatory officers (Chengguan) in urban China. While both accountability and discretion are individually associated with improved performance, our findings reveal a trade-off between the two: the interaction effect is negative. When discretion is high, the marginal benefit of increased accountability diminishes. This suggests that discretion and accountability act as substitute mechanisms for achieving SLB performance, rather than complementary ones. We contribute to the extant literature by elucidating the intricate relationship between accountability and discretion in shaping the performance of SLBs.