The conditions for reducing electoral violence through constitutional reform

Constitution-making is promoted by the international community as a means to encourage democratization and peaceful politics. However, there is a dearth of studies investigating the conditions under which constitutional replacement can induce such positive outcomes. Notably, many constitutional reforms enhance the power of semi-autocratic leaders or institutionalize democratic backsliding. Since party representatives often participate as negotiators in constitution-making processes, and political parties are key perpetrators of electoral violence, this study suggests that constitutional reform can constrain electoral violence if the process involves negotiated agreement between political elites and the reform includes measures that increase executive constraints. I test this claim through a matched analysis of 155 constitutional reforms from 1946 to 2015. The analysis shows that constitutional replacements that result from negotiated agreements between representatives of distinct groups and constrain the executive’s ability to enact a state of emergency are associated with lower levels of ensuing government-perpetrated violence. By contrast, these measures have no association with electoral violence carried out by non-government actors, suggesting that reform of formal institutions may be less effective in constraining violence by other actors in society. The findings have significant implications for the design of constitution-making processes that promote peaceful government conduct while highlighting the need for alternative measures to constrain other electoral violence.