The article reveals the evolving US strategy against biological weapons in partnership with Japan, highlighting biosecurity improvements and nuclear policy shifts.
This article explores what a committed deterrence by denial approach to biological threats could mean for the US-Japanese alliance. In an emerging, sharper deterrence by denial approach, nations aim to deny the intended effects of biological weapons use through their ability to detect and respond swiftly and effectively, at the same time that the nation conducting such an attack would incur punishment. The article begins by providing details on this and other ways that US strategy has grown more ambitious since the early 2000s. Factors include Russia's war in Ukraine and biological weapons programs by nations such as North Korea, as well as opportunities for leveraging rapid advances in biotechnology, AI, and other fields. Japan's expanding domestic biosecurity and biodefense capacities should also play an increasingly important role, including the knowledge and capacity built via its new BSL-4 facility and efforts by AI companies to develop new tools. The article also explores how this landscape of strengthened biodefense interacts with nuclear declaratory policy. The article concludes that Japan and the United States must institutionalize consultations, expand co-innovation and link biological resilience to broader deterrence, with the potential to best address biological threats in the near term and reshape nuclear policy over time.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Nishida et al. (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: