This article examines Turkey's recent reconciliation with Gulf states, suggesting it may not be lasting due to ideological differences.
In July 2023, despite more than a decade of enmity, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan secured a string of multibillion‐dollar deals with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. What explains the abrupt thaw, and is this a durable realignment or a temporary detour? This article contends that interstate relations are shaped primarily by identity. In the early 2000s, Turkey abandoned its secular tradition and embraced political Islam. During the Arab Spring, this ideology led it to build links to the Muslim Brotherhood—a group that Saudi Arabia and the UAE saw as a threat to regime stability. Despite the political and economic risks, the analysis shows, Ankara's behavior was driven by its identity. The article compares the period of conflict to the post‐2020 opening between Turkey and the Gulf states. While economic interests have become more salient, resulting in cooperation, the findings indicate that the underlying ideological differences persist. Reconciliation is therefore likely to be reversible, not enduring. This article is part of a series on Turkey‐Gulf relations, guest edited by Hamdullah Baycar and Betul Dogan‐Akkas, based on the Gulf Studies Symposium organized by the Gulf International Forum, April 11–12, 2025, at Georgetown University in Washington.
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Engin Koc (2026) studied this question.
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