Excess Control Rights of Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Investment Efficiency

Key Points

• The research examines how excess control rights of controlling shareholders affect corporate investment efficiency.
• Utilized an unbalanced panel data set from 30,057 firms listed in South Korea from 2006 to 2024.
• Employed panel data regression analysis and panel Tobit analysis for the study.
• Analyzed the relationship between excess control rights and investment efficiency with a focus on nonlinear effects.
• Identified a nonlinear inverse U-shaped relationship between excess control rights and investment efficiency.
• Excess control rights positively influence investment efficiency within the range of 0 to 24.13%; beyond this point, the influence becomes negative.
• Segregated dependent variables into overinvestment and underinvestment, revealing a U-shaped relationship with overinvestment but no significant correlation with underinvestment.