Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict

Building on recent scholarship on reputation in international politics, this article argues that, because reputation for resolve cannot form in international conflicts due to anarchy, politicians' persistent belief in the value of reputation for resolve is merely a cult of reputation. After outlining the logic of the cult and an operational code derived from it, this article examines the pattern of influence that the cult has exerted on state behavior in conflicts. It then explores the possible cause of the cult. Finally, it proposes that integrating structural and psychological factors may be a productive enterprise for understanding state behavior, and that further work along this line may lead to interesting findings. Shiping Tang is associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. He is also co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue. Acknowledgments For discussion and comments, the author would like to thank Andrew Batson, Thomas Christensen, Keith Clemenger, James Fearon, Avery Goldstein, Peter Gries, Richard Herrmann, Richard Ned Lebow, Jonathan Mercer, Robert Powell, Robert Ross, Matthew Rudolph, and two anonymous reviewers. Special thanks are due to Daryl Press for sending the author part of his unpublished book manuscript. The usual disclaimer applies. Notes Shiping Tang is associate research fellow and deputy director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. He is also co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue. 1This article deals exclusively with the role of reputation for resolve in international conflicts. For the important distinction between "reputation for resolve" and "reputation for power," see Paul Huth, "Reputation and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment," Security Studies 7, no. 1 (fall 1997): 75–78. For the role of reputation (for commitment or compliance) in international cooperation, see Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 125–126; Robert Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World(London: Routledge, 2002), 95–96, 125–126; and Beth Simmons, "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs," American Political Science Review 94, no 4 (December 2000): 819–35. 2When politicians (and sometimes theorists, too) talk about "reputation" and "credibility," they frequently use the two terms interchangeably—with each other and with "honor," "resolve," and "prestige." In reality, reputation (for resolve) is only one of the three components of credibility (more on this point later). Throughout this article, I use the terms "reputation" and "credibility" distinctively unless they are embedded in original quotations. 3Schelling's two classics laid down much of the foundation: Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Also see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Westport: Greenwood, 1961). The literature of deterrence theory is enormous; for excellent reviews, see Paul Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates," Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 25–48; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence Theory: Theory and Evidence," World Politics 41, no. 2 (January 1989): 183–207; and Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 289–324. 4Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 36. 5Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 186–187. 6Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 10. 7Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence,ed. Steven Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 63. 8Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 228. 9Major works include Robert McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," Diplomatic History 15, no. 4 (fall 1991): 455–71; James Fearon, "Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interest," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (June 1994): 236–69; Ted Hopf, Peripheral Visions: Deterrence and American Foreign Policy in the Third Word (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994); Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Daryl G. Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility during the Cuban Missile Crisis," paper presented at the 2001 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/CMS/files/PressDaryl.pdf; and Daryl G. Press, "Does Backing Down Hurt Credibility? Evidence from the "Appeasement Crises, 1938–39," manuscript. Huth also tested whether a state's past behavior has any effect on crisis bargaining, but his result was a bit ambiguous. Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), chap. 6. 10Works in this category include those of MacMahon and Hopf cited above. 11Works in this category include those of Fearon, Mercer, and Press cited above. 12Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origin of the First World War," International Security 9, no. 1 (summer 1984): 58–107. See also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). 13Mercer, Reputation and International Politics. 14McMahon, "Credibility and World Power," 455. 15Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 15, 27. 16Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 15. See also Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 42. 17Snyder and Diesing made a similar point: "'resolve' and 'credibility' are close to being the opposites of the same coin." Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 50n11. See also George Kent, The Effects of Threats, Mershon Center Pamphlet Series (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967), 84–86. 18 The American Heritage Dictionary (New York: Dell, 1983), 586. For a similar definition, see New Webster's Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language (Danbury: Lexicon, 1992), 846. 19Making credibility a truly relational concept essentially means that whether a state can gain a certain kind of credibility depends mostly, if not entirely, on whether observers confer that kind of credibility on it. A state can desire a certain kind of credibility and try to influence the formation of that credibility, but ultimately it cannot control the outcome of that process. Put differently, cultivating certain kinds of credibility through certain behaviors may or may not work. 20For instance, China's threat to intervene in the Korean War was deemed incredible by General Douglas MacArthur because he did not believe that China had the capability to fight a meaningful war against his troops. On the other hand, the U.S. threat that it would fight to the end was largely dismissed by North Vietnam because the Vietnamese did not believe the U.S. had much interest in Vietnam. For a similar but less developed argument, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 15. 21Mercer's distinction between "specific" and "general" reputation has a similar logic but is closer to Morgan's distinction between "immediate" and "general" deterrence and to Snyder and Diesing's distinction between "background or long-term" and "immediate" images. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 37–39; Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), chap. 2; and Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 291. I also distinguish between bargaining and behavioral reputation for power. 22Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 16, 42, 59–60. 23Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, 48–49. For similar views, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, 116–25; Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, 185; James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of War," International Organization 49, no. 3 (summer 1995): 400; and Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43, no. 3 (April 1991): 313–35. 24The author thanks Thomas Christensen for this point. Needless to say, politicians' resolve often depends on their assessment of relative capability, and assessing is not easy under most circumstances. For a general discussion of the problem of assessment, see Shiping Tang, "A Systemic Theory of Security Environment," Journal of Strategic Studies 27, no. 1 (March 2004): 1–34. 25As Jervis noted, "states have often cared about specific issues less for their intrinsic value than for the conclusion they felt others would draw from the way they dealt with them." Jervis, Logic of Images, 7. For a similar argument, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 39. 26This article focuses on reputation among opponents only. Although fear of losing reputation among allies also weighs heavily among decisionmakers, reputation between two adversaries matters far more than between two allies. For a similar argument, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 4. 27This is consistent with "prospect theory"—that one is willing to pay a heavier price to defend what one already possesses. For a review, see Jack S. Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations," International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (March 1997): 87–112. For a classic statement that reputation is something worth fighting for, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, 124. 28Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics(Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 208. 29Others may prefer to label this belief in the fungibility of reputation as a belief that commitments are interdependent or as "past action theory." See Schelling, Arms and Influence, 55–59; Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 36–42; Huth, "Deterrence and International Conflict," 32–34; and Press, "Does Backing Down Hurt Credibility?" Mercer, Huth, and Press all point out that there is a broader and a narrower version of this belief. *Although the possibility that politicians may simply "use" the cult to sell their policies and justify their actions cannot be completely ruled out, their rhetoric in private (and to a lesser degree, their rhetoric in closed meetings), when they do not have much need to sell and justify, suggests otherwise. Moreover, they often took costly actions (such as the actual use of force) following their cult rhetoric, and they continued to defend the logic of the cult even after backing down in crisis (see below). For a discussion of the believability of rhetoric in private and in closed meetings, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 13n16. The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this issue. **Theoretically, after backing down, politicians can also deny that there will be any loss of credibility by denouncing the cult and its logic. This act, however, is rarely observed. Politicians' refusal to denounce the cult after retreat has two possible explanations. First, politicians may actually believe in the cult. Second, they may have no intention of repudiating the cult because doing so would undercut their ability to justify future actions; thus it is better to deny that anything was lost. Although this second explanation cannot be completely ruled out, the first explanation seems far more plausible in light of politicians' often vehement denial that they backed down even when their denial is plainly untenable: politicians' refusal to denounce the cult actually underscores their firm belief in the cult. ***This is the "entrapment" phenomenon in alliance politics. See Snyder, "Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics." The notion of "abandonment" and "entrapment" first appeared in Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (New York.: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 30Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making," International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 190–222. 31Most existing literatures focus on type I behavior and rhetoric. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics; Hopf, Peripheral Visions; Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility"; and McMahon, "Credibility and World Power." Some of the most illustrative examples of type II rhetoric came from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev after the Berlin crisis and the Cuban missile crisis. For instance, after backing down from his ultimatum on Berlin, Khrushchev nonetheless declared that he won: "It was a great victory for us, and it was without firing a single shot"(type II-a, discussed below). See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 510. After the Cuban missile debacle, Khrushchev again contended, "We feel that the aggressor came out the loser. He made preparations to attack Cuba but we stopped him and forced him to recognize before world public opinion that he won't do it at the current stage. We view this as a great victory" (type II-a). See letter from Khrushchev to Castro, 30 October 1962, in The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader,ed. Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1992), 243. Khrushchev also put his retreat from Cuba on the high ground: "In order to save the world, we must retreat" (type II-b, discussed below). Quoted in Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble" Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (New York: Norton, 1997), 282. 32For the relationship between repeated games and the concern for reputation and credibility, see Harrison Wagner, "Rationality and Misperception in Deterrence Theory," Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 2 (1992): 128–35. On rivalry, see Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, "Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns," International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 147–71; Paul F. Diehl, ed., Enduring Rivalries (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996); and John A. Vasquez, "Distinguishing Rivals That Go to War from Those That Do Not: A Quantitative Comparative Case Study of the Two Paths to War," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 4 (December 1996): 531–58. 33That is, this rivalry should be an easy test for the cult. For detailed elaboration, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 15–18. *Hopf, Peripheral Visions; and Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility." Most important, Press also largely discredited the quintessential case supporting the logic of the cult: Hitler's famous quote before the invasion of Poland ("Our enemies are little worms, I saw them in Munich"). Press, "Does Backing Down Hurt Credibility?" For an earlier discussion of the Munich case, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 217–19. 35Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 18–22. One may also add that the Soviet Union had previously backed down from the 1946 Iran-Turkey crisis, the 1946–47 Turkey-Greece crisis, and the 1948–49 Berlin blockade. 36For a detailed discussion, see Press, "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 7–10. 37Ibid., 46, 57 (emphasis in original). 38Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexities in Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 170–71. Press made a similar point in "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility," 58. Indeed, during the entire cold war, there might have been two cases about which one may reasonably argue that the United States might have underestimated the Soviets' resolve: (1) during the Berlin crisis in 1958, when Eisenhower told congressional leaders that he could take a tough stand because the Soviets had bluffed before (cited in Jervis, Systemic Effects, 170); and (2) during the 1973 Middle East crisis, when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger assured China that Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev's ultimatum to intervene was a bluff (see William Burr, ed., The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow [New York: New Press, 1998], 157). These two cases, however, were not clear-cut, because in both cases U.S. decisionmakers' rhetoric could be explained by the powerful need to assure allies—domestic allies and China, respectively. Indeed, Kissinger's assurance was contradicted by his own actions. He was unimpressed by White House chief of staff Alexander Haig's conviction that the Soviets were bluffing, stating, "I did not see it as a bluff (but it made no difference)," and he acted according to the worst-case scenario anyway by ordering a worldwide military alert (Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval[Boston: Little, Brown, 1982], 585). This article's argument is also supported by the fact that Kissinger presented two contradictory versions of the story. In his memoir, he wrote that the worst scenario was more likely (that is, that the Soviets meant business), yet while talking to the Chinese ambassador, Zhen Huang, he assured China that the Soviets were bluffing (thus Burr's interpretation of Kissinger's comments was too simplistic). Truman, in a different setting, put the need to assure more explicitly: "If, however, the threat to South Korea was met firmly and successfully, it would add to our success in Iran, Berlin, and Greece (Turkey) a fourth success in opposition to the aggressive moves of the Communists. And each success, we suggested to our allies, was likely to add to the caution of the Soviets in undertaking new efforts of this kind." Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol 2: Years of Trial and Hope(Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), 339 (emphasis added). Of course, Truman was perhaps also trying to seize the opportunity for mobilizing the nation. On this point, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Domestic and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Peripheral Khrushchev might have been the only leader that did from to his resolve when a crisis in Berlin and belief that the Soviet threat a role in the United and to down during the crisis might have him to bluff again in See and the to Harvard University Press, of and might have Khrushchev to the resolve in See Secret on the Berlin Crisis, War International History no. 3 (fall 1993): Khrushchev, however, acted during crisis bargaining and rarely underestimated U.S. credibility when it truly Reputation and International Politics. the our on more than for opponents and allies. the of on this had largely because of Snyder and Diesing that politicians to that and future bargaining reputation in all the cases they Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, The cult is not to For instance, during the crisis between and both and chief General the as to our resolve" and a test for and military in (New available at in after was forced to down that might be more than if there were (New available at Peripheral For a of the role of credibility in the of American see McMahon, "Credibility and World Power." to a of on New H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance World Politics no. 4 1984): For a recent discussion of reputation in alliance politics, see D. on Alliance and the of the Security Studies no. 3 M. Nuclear to Beijing during the Crisis," For a Chinese on see he second crisis and no. (April Arms and Influence, George and Richard Deterrence in American Foreign Theory and (New York: University Press, 1974), Also see Jervis, Logic of Images, The (emphasis added). of the trans. and ed. He 1992), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), and chap. 10. to our discussion is the of from International 30 and in The of the (New York: and concern for their was from See with by and of Soviet A. M. and 18 both available at that politicians' concern for is one important the I that the concern for which is a of among opponents and allies, is at The two kinds of in that the international is the may be For the original discussion of and see James D. Fearon, Political and the of International American Political Science Review no 3 1994): Goertz and put it, of future Goertz and Diehl, "Enduring and The International Security no. 4 and Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, and that this was in all of the cases they Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, put it, "A means of and sometimes the only is the of Schelling, The Strategy of "Power, Reputation, and Assessments of Credibility." In the world, one would be to a single case in which a state's the state's "reputation of resolve as a In this of deterrence theory was not See Mercer, and International Politics, 15. Ned Lebow, in the South The of the War," in and ed. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and John University Press, course, it is possible that simply to their resolve (that is, they to be more than they actually by cult For a detailed discussion on to war, see Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations of Reputation and International Politics, chap. Theory of International Politics, and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, the is a of or only a an of For a discussion, see International Organization no. 3 (summer 1997): I thank for bringing this point to on worst-case but did not its for reputation. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, Moreover, sometimes on worst-case to with his discussion of assessment of and at not however, that a state's bargaining credibility in a crisis will Indeed, a state's bargaining credibility in its as the state costly moves to its a more of "reputation He argues that an a explanation for a state's past behavior, a reputation is In the presented that unless a state's versus its being for adversaries and for there is no reputation with Mercer, Logic of Images, point at the of the theory in crisis See James D. and A of American Journal of Political Science no. 4 1989): James D. Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy versus Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 1997): and Schelling, Arms and Influence, an of in U.S. deterrence during the cold war, see Robert Jervis, The of the Nuclear Revolution: and the of (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989): for instance, "Deterrence and in the International Security no. 2 (fall and Thomas J. Christensen, Power and in U.S. China International Security no. 2 (fall 2000): a similar point, see Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, Logic of Images, is a under because there is no among the In the that and a that his his or Schelling, Arms and Influence, 37, Arms and Influence, that backed down were more likely to be the that the threat of in the crisis. J. Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 3 and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, Kissinger was that United States must out in the world which its to to be a world See We for this Snyder and Diesing do not the by the of the cult to the worst-case Snyder and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, (emphasis added). and Diesing, Conflict among Nations, The is from a see of War University Press, in M. A on of American New October Of course, one can argue that was trying to save his own while was trying to justify his