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June 1, 1984Australasian Journal of Philosophy165 citations

Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness

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DBDavid O. Brink

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Abstract

(1984). Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 111-125.

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David O. Brink (1984) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/69dbc9edc9a120f055a3c8ffhttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048408412341311
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