Revenue Distribution Behavior of the Authorized Operation of Public Data—Evidence from China

Unclear mechanisms of revenue distribution are a core bottleneck restricting the improvement in the efficiency of the authorized operation of public data in China, which is crucial for advancing sustainable development and fulfilling the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). To address this issue, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, the operating entities, and the demand sides. The aim is to analyze the dynamic impact pathways of the mechanisms of revenue distribution on the strategic choices of each entity. By establishing replicator dynamic equations and conducting simulations using system dynamics, the study reveals the interaction between stable strategies in behavioral evolution and key parameters. Results indicate that the probability of compliant transactions by the demand sides is positively correlated with their data utilization benefits and the intensity of the rewards and punishments of the government. Moreover, the data protection behavior of the operating entities is significantly influenced by the supervision of the government and the rent-seeking costs of the demand sides. Furthermore, the government needs to adopt dynamic supervision strategies to balance market efficiency and data security. Accordingly, this study proposes policy recommendations such as establishing a dynamic mechanism of revenue distribution linked to behavioral performance and constructing a distribution framework that aligns risks with benefits. In this way, collaborative cooperation among entities can be effectively incentivized.