God as Intrinsic Formal Cause: A Platonic Response to Aseity-Based Objections

Some argue that God cannot function as an intrinsic formal cause of creatures without compromising divine aseity. By an intrinsic formal cause, I mean more than an exemplary formal cause: it is the claim that God enters into the metaphysical composition of created things and thereby becomes a metaphysical part of them (hence the term intrinsic ). This concern regarding divine aseity underlies recent criticisms of Jeremiah Carey’s view that God is present in creatures as their formal cause. I sketch a Platonic version of the “God as Intrinsic Formal Cause” (GIFC) theory, according to which God is the formal cause of at least one creaturely perfection, namely goodness, in a way that makes God immanent to creation as a metaphysical part of creatures. I then assess whether this view falls to aseity-based objections, especially those raised by James Dominic Rooney and a line of argument from Aquinas ( Summa contra Gentiles I.26.4). I argue that while such objections may apply to other versions of GIFC, they do not succeed against the Platonic version defended here. I close by clarifying the view’s commitments and distinguishing it from positions that would make God spatially located in, or causally dependent on, creation.