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Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Ken Menkhaus is Professor of Political Science, Davidson College. This paper is adapted from a research input originally commissioned in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The debate over the relevance of preventive diplomacy is rich and entertaining. This paper will not address the debate directly except to argue here that it often degenerates into a false choice. One need not reject the entire corpus of neo‐realist thinking about the nature of armed conflicts to accept the importance and relevance of conflict prevention. For a concise set of examples summarising the debate itself, see Stedman (Citation1995) and the rejoinder by Lund (Citation1996). A thoughtful treatment of the shortcomings of realist critiques of preventive diplomacy can be found in Jentleson (Citation2000). One example of the effort to advance preventive strategies in US foreign policy was USAID's sponsorship of 'Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Guide for Practitioners' (Creative Associates, Citation1996). NGOs noted here are but a few examples of the many organisations working in this field. This confusion over terminology and the variable quality of research is perhaps an unavoidable product of an emerging sub‐field. Here, we distinguish only between 'root causes' and 'precipitating causes.' Some analyses go further and differentiate between systemic or background causes (such as resource scarcity); enabling or proximate causes (such as political repression or ethnic mobilisation); and triggering or immediate factors (specific acts of repression or a sudden economic crisis). (Creative Associates, Citation1996). A virtually identical debate is occurring in the field of national security studies, pitting 'wideners' (those who would include environmental, health, and economic issues as part of national security) versus traditionalists (who prefer a narrow, military definition of national security). See Finel (Citation1998). Peacebuilding has come to be an especially confusing term, as some use it to refer to post‐conflict efforts and others to refer to pre‐conflict initiatives. Evans (Citation1993) discusses both pre‐ and post‐conflict peacebuilding. In this paper, I use the term mainly to refer to post‐conflict efforts to prevent recurrence of armed hostilities, but occasionally in the broader sense, as Evans does. In reality, of course, powerful states have a long history of fabricating and employing tendentious legal arguments to rationalise intervention into weaker states for reasons other than humanitarian imperatives. For that reason, objections to the creation of new norms and regimes for humanitarian interventionism seem oddly naïve. The argument that the promotion of an international regime of humanitarian intervention and conflict prevention would give strong states legal pretext to interfere in a sovereign state's affairs ignores the fact that strong states that are—for reasons good or bad—determined to intervene in a weak state currently have no shortage of legal rationalisations for their actions. A summary of this project's findings is published in Esty et al. (1998). Analytical models designed to predict conflict are improving, however, as resources are directed toward greater research on the topic. Dozens of projects on this score have been launched, such as the Minorities at Risk Project (Gurr, Citation2000) and the State Failure Project; a useful compilation of the findings of these systemic conflict prediction models is found in Davies and Gurr (Citation2000). One, the PROOM project, identified no fewer than 408 variables in its 'Master List of Potential and 'Good Prospect' Domestic Conflict (De)‐Escalation Indicators' (see Schmid, Citation1998). The inevitable complexity of some of this highly quantitative research has resulted in models that resemble DNA molecules and are indecipherable to all but a few scholars. More parsimonious models have been called for, and scholars active in this field express optimism that refinements in their models may yet provide the level of predictive accuracy that famine early warning systems now achieve (Harff, Citation1998). Anyone who worked on the crises in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Somalia is fully aware of how polarised social scientists and international aid workers can become in their interpretations of events and culpability. Outside observers often become captive to the views of informants from one side of the conflict, and accept their interpretations uncritically. Food security early warning systems include USAID's Famine Early Warning System; the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation's Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture; and the European Union's Food Security Assessment Unit. By far the most comprehensive of these surveys of preventive tools is Creative Associates (Citation1996, pp. 41–176). See also Lund, Citation1996; Carnegie Commission, Citation1997b; Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Citation1999; and Björkdahl, Citation2000. Readers interested in that level of assessment are referred to Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflict: A Guide for Practitioners. Creative Associates (Citation1996). Additional informationNotes on contributorsKen Menkhaus Footnote Ken Menkhaus is Professor of Political Science, Davidson College. This paper is adapted from a research input originally commissioned in 2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
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