Revisiting Chinese Pacifism

C hinese pacifism is a long-debated issue. Since Western contact with China in the early nineteenth century, conventional wisdom has it that Imperial China was peaceful, and that its wars were basically defensive and viewed as a last resort. Most China scholars tend to associate China with pacifism.1 In the recent past, this conventional wisdom has faced two major challenges. One group of scholars argues that China was neither peaceful nor warlike. Neorealists such as Jack Snyder tend to attribute differences in military strategy across states to their external or internal structures rather than their different cultures. For Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, the Chinese were capable of both peace and war, and showed no preference for either option. What explains violence is not culture but need and opportunity. The presence of need and opportunity led to Chinese expansion. Geographical obstacles or foreign resistance stopped Chinese expansion. Warren Cohen argues that Chinese culture does not demand or preclude aggression. China behaved like other great powers. A strong China has been aggressive, and a weak China has been defensive.2 The other group goes further to claim that Chinese culture was not peaceful.3 For example, Alastair Johnston studies the foreign policy of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). He emphasizes that the seven military classics were widely read by the ruling class, and identifies two major strategic cultures: a Confucian-Mencian paradigm and a hard realpolitik paradigm. For him, the former was superficial and hollow, and the latter characterized operative strategic culture in traditional China.4 The old thesis of Chinese pacifism has been challenged for legitimate reasons. It lacks conceptual clarity and systematic support. Conceptually, pacifism has many meanings. Even pacifists are not homogenous. Some pacifists decry all