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Demonstrates the dynamics of awareness and moral hazard in Temporary Disability Insurance, suggesting public information campaigns can enhance employment.
When workers are not aware of a mandated benefit, they cannot take it into account in their employment decision, leading to deadweight loss. On the other hand, lack of awareness of a benefit reduces moral hazard, decreasing deadweight loss. I incorporate these trade‐offs into a model of mandated benefits and apply the model to Temporary Disability Insurance, an employment benefit mandated in five states. First, using data collected through an original survey, I provide evidence that there is low awareness of this benefit. Second, I use the updated mandated benefits model to show that over a broad range of reasonable assumptions, the additional employee valuation of the benefit outweighs the additional program cost from moral hazard, and thus a public information campaign would increase employment.
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Jessica H. Brown (2021) studied this question.
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