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Empirical analysis reveals cost-sharing subsidies induce moral hazard and raise premiums in ACA exchanges, indicating subsidized utilization can unravel private insurance markets.
We identify and quantify a new form of welfare loss in insurance markets. We first show theoretically that moral hazard from subsidies for cost‐sharing combined with community rating mimics adverse selection and can unravel insurance markets. To quantify the potential welfare loss, we use exogenous variation in the number of subsidized enrollees on the ACA exchanges. We find that subsidy‐induced moral hazard led to higher premiums, which has lowered enrollment among the unsubsidized by 6.2 percentage points. We estimate the welfare costs of this “moral hazard induced unraveling” to be around 25% of the total welfare loss.
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Ellis et al. (2026) studied this question.
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