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The article demonstrates that the expansion of energy cooperation between Russia and China following the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict in 2022 is primarily the result of agreements initiated since 2014. It claims that a combination of internal factors stemming from differences in Russia’s and China’s energy policies, and the corporate interests of both domestic and international oil companies, in the context of United States sanctions, is to blame for the difficulties in concluding new large-scale agreements since February 24, 2022. While an increase in Russia-supplied energy has contributed to China’s energy security, further growth is hampered by China’s policy of diversifying its energy partners to avoid over-dependence on any given state, unless the conditions are especially favorable. Additionally, Russia successfully replaced oil and coal exports to Europe with shipments to China and India. By looking into the case of negotiations over the Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, the article demonstrates that even in a system of centralized top-down decision-making in the energy sector, as exemplified by Russia and China, market considerations and different interests of state-owned enterprises are powerful enough to preclude the leadership from putting the decisions into practice. It explains how the prevalence of a buyer’s market and China’s stronger bargaining position are reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding signed in September 2025.
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A.A. Kireeva (2026) studied this question.
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