Argument shows non-affective hope sustains moral motivation over wild despair, suggesting a need for deeper understanding of affects.
A common view among latter-day Kantians is that hope is needed to defeat the threat of moral demotivation. I argue against this view by drawing on Kant’s neglected account of despair. On this account, despair is an affect in response to hopelessness. A certain kind of despair—wild despair—can be intensely motivating. Wild moral despair (as I call it) can even help to sustain moral motivation. Yet this presents a challenge: since wild moral despair can defeat moral demotivation, why hope over despair? I answer that by hindering reflection, affects hinder the exercise of our practical rationality for Kant. Yet this cost extends not only to despair, but also to affective hope. Non-affective hope can defeat moral demotivation without this cost, and thus is the kind of hope that has true value for Kant.
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Joe Stratmann (2026) studied this question.
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