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Examines regulatory impacts on net-zero behaviours in information infrastructure operators, suggesting adaptive strategies.
Information infrastructure is essential for digital transformation and AI-enabled services, but its operation also involves high electricity consumption and carbon emissions. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, information-infrastructure operators and the public, and integrates it with system dynamics to examine how regulatory mechanisms influence operators’ net-zero behaviours. The model focuses on operational-stage information infrastructure. Initial parameters are calibrated using the 2023 China Statistical Yearbook on Resources and Environment and expert consultation, with key variables measured by operational revenue, net-zero costs, regulatory costs, incentives, penalties, public scrutiny costs and environmental losses. The results show that operators’ net-zero behaviours may fluctuate under weak or static regulation. Government incentives, penalties and public scrutiny can promote net-zero operations, while dynamic reward–penalty mechanisms are more effective in stabilising behavioural evolution. This study extends evolutionary game theory and system dynamics to the net-zero governance of information infrastructure and provides an adaptive regulatory framework for coordinating government regulation, operator behaviour and public participation.
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Tang et al. (2026) studied this question.
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