Ideological matching and alignment formation: evidence from China’s perception of the United States in early cold war years

A rising power’s perception of a hegemon’s potential alignment formation shapes the rising power’s strategies, which begs the question: under what circumstances does a rising power correctly perceive the possibility of a hegemon’s alignment formation? The power transition theory, the misperception theory, and the alignment theory provide key insights when addressing this question. Based upon these theories, this article proposes an ideological matching theory, arguing that the ideological configurations of a rising power, a hegemon, and a third party (the hegemon’s potential ally) explain the rising power’s perception of the possibility of alignment formation between the hegemon and the third party. This article uses three historical cases of China’s perception in early Cold War Asia to evaluate the validity of the theory: an overestimation of United States-Soviet Union relations in 1959–60, an underestimation of United States–UK relations during the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954–5, and a correct perception of the United States–Cambodia relations in 1954–5. The ideological matching among the rising power, the hegemon, and the third power serves as a baseline for the rising power to judge the prospect of the hegemon’s alignment behavior.