Clientelism and Ethnic Brokerage in Outer Island Indonesia

This article examines the dynamics of clientelism within Dayak communities in Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, focusing on how ethnic institutions sustain long-term intermediary networks that operate beyond electoral cycles. In contrast to mainstream scholarship, which often emphasizes transactional and temporary forms of electoral clientelism, this study focuses on the role of the Dayak Customary Council (Dewan Adat Dayak or DAD) as a social network structure that mediates access to state resources and consolidates local elite power through institutional capture. The study examines how DAD integrates customary structures into the state’s bureaucratic hierarchy, from the village to provincial levels as well as through customary law (kedamangan) institutions. The findings reveal that political actors capitalize on their Dayak ethnic identity to secure investment flows and long–term political support within bureaucratic arenas. This article expands understanding of clientelism by showing that institutionalized ethnic networks in Indonesia can generate stable patronage arrangements in which ethnic organizations function as permanent intermediaries within the country’s decentralized governance system.