Crusius, Care Ethics, and the Dependence Model of Human Nature

Care ethicists often critique the history of Western philosophy for its tendency, at least within certain movements, to conceive of human nature in terms of independence. They argue that this has led some to disregard dependence’s role in human life, which in turn has led them to sideline care as basic to morality. In this paper, I complicate this narrative by examining the thought of the eighteenth-century philosopher Christian August Crusius. Like care ethicists, Crusius constructs his moral philosophy upon a model of human nature that places dependence at the center, arguing that moral obligations follow from dependence upon God. Following an examination of dependence in both theories, I discuss various points of overlap and distinction between them and identify ways in which both care ethicists and Crusius scholars stand to benefit from engaging with one another. In view of this analysis, I conclude that Crusius helps to bridge the gap between care ethics and the history of philosophy and should therefore be understood as a strong ally of care ethics with respect to their shared commitment to the dependence model of human nature and their efforts to construct a moral theory rooted therein.