Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands

Abstract Why do states launch diversionary conflicts? In particular, why did Argentina invade the Falkland Islands in 1982? The existing literature tends to analyze diversionary conflict by examining the direct relationship between domestic unrest (the independent variable) and the use of force (the dependent variable). But such an approach ignores critical variables that shape the likelihood of diversionary conflict. When states face domestic unrest, they have a number of options: they can launch a diversionary conflict, they can reform, or they can repress. We therefore need to consider which variables alter the attractiveness of each of these options, employing what I term "the policy alternatives approach." The decision to launch a diversionary conflict may result more from the inability to reform or repress, than it does from the perceived utility of using force to rally the public. An important variable that facilitates or constrains a state's ability to reform or repress is state extractive capacity. The policy alternatives approach enables a new explanation for the invasion of the Falklands, based on the interaction between domestic unrest and low state extractive capacity, and also highlights a number of other variables that may explain diversionary conflicts. I thank Richard Herrmann, John Mueller, Brian Pollins, Dominic Tierney, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Notes 1In Argentina, the islands are known as Islas Malvinas. 2The diversionary war hypothesis is supported by a number of case studies and anecdotal evidence, but quantitative analyses suggest that there is, at best, only weak evidence of a general relationship between internal turmoil and war. For an excellent review, see Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in A Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus Midlarsky (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989), 259–88. 3A number of recent studies suggest that the addition of policy alternatives to the diversionary theory of war may be useful for understanding the relationship between internal and external conflict. See, for example, D. Scott Bennett and Timothy Nordstrom, "Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems in Enduring Rivalries," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (February 2000): 33–61; Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhardt, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad," American Journal of Political Science 43 (January 1999): 56–85; Brett Ashley Leeds and David Davis, "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (December 1997): 814–34; Diana Richards, T. Clifton Morgan, Rick K. Wilson, Valerie L. Schwebach, and Garry D. Young, "Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37 (September 1993): 504–35; Paul K. Huth and Ellen Lusk-Okar, "Foreign Policy Choices and Domestic Politics: A Reexamination of the Link between Domestic and International Conflict," in Conflict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War, and Peace, ed. Frank P. Harvey and Ben D. Moore (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), 62–95. See especially Christopher Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41 (April 1997): 255–82. Gelpi's study suggests that repression may be the preferred alternative to diversionary conflicts for non-democratic states facing unrest. 4Openly expressed public dissatisfaction with the performance of the government will provoke—under the right conditions—a diversionary conflict. Signs of domestic unrest include protest demonstrations aimed at the national government, strikes, work stoppages intended to change government policy, riots, and armed attacks by organized groups targeted at the government. 5See Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans, "Peace through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (August 2003): 445–46. Chiozza and Goemans identify three causal logics in the diversionary war literature: gambling for resurrection, the scapegoat hypothesis, and the rally-around-the-flag or in-group/out-group hypotheses. They overlook, however, two additional reasons why diversionary conflicts may be initiated: the desire to simply distract the public from internal problems and the hope that a foreign policy success will demonstrate the government's competence to the public. Furthermore, gambling for resurrection is likely to be the motivation behind each of these explanations for diversionary action. As a result, I do not include this as a separate explanation for the initiation of a diversionary conflict. For a discussion of gambling for resurrection, see Richards, "Good Times, Bad Times"; George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 68–71; Alastair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems,"International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 133–53. 6Arno J. Mayer, Dynamics of counterrevolution in Europe, 1870–1956 (New York: Harper Jack Levy, "An Introduction to Prospect Theory," Political Psychology 13 (June 1992): 171–86. 7Regarding reform, I mean attempts by the government to liberalize the political system by, for example, increasing governing institutions' representativeness, allowing greater freedom of the press, and permitting political parties to form. A government adopts a policy of repression if it seeks to suppress domestic groups through internal policing or enacts restrictive legislation, such as banning political parties, halting elections, and withdrawing the right to freely assemble. 8Gordon Craig, "History as a Humanistic Discipline," in Historical Literacy, ed. Paul Gagnon (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 134. 9See David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 144; Bennett and Nordstrom, "Foreign Policy Substitutability"; Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, "International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and 'Nice' Laws," World Politics 36 (April 1984): 383–406; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, "Toward a Scientific Understanding of International Conflict: A Personal View," International Studies Quarterly (June 1985): 130; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, Inquiry, Logic, and International Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1989); David H. Clark and William Reed, "The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution," American Journal of Political Science 49 (July 2005): 609–24. 10Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 11. See also Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 9; Graham Allison, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 144. 11Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter B. Evens, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 16–17. 12See, for example, Christensen, Useful Adversaries; Alan Lamborn, The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991); A.F.K.Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981); David M. Rowe, "World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe," International Organization 53 (Spring 1999): 195–231; Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In"; Harvey Starr, "Revolution and War: Rethinking the Linkage Between Internal and External Conflict," Political Research Quarterly 47 (June 1994): 481–507; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. 13One could argue that the concept of extractive capacity is difficult to apply across regime types. However, Christensen finds that, while the exact process by which these states extract resources may be different, "the state-society constraints can be compared across very different types of regimes." Christensen,Useful Adversaries, 22. For a further discussion of this issue, see Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman, "Relative Political Capacity: Political Extraction and Political Reach," in Political Capacity and Economic Behavior, ed. Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 11–45. 14Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 87–88. Blainey does admit, however, that wars initiated by resource-poor states "could break out if other factors were pushing strongly toward war." Ibid., 95. 15For an excellent review of neo-classical realism, see Gideon Rose, "Neo-Classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics 51 (October 1998): 144–72. 16Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 38 (emphasis in the original). See also Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 106. Note that while this logic may be consistent with realism, realist scholars often confront difficulties when attempting to explain the outbreak of these types of wars. Because they are initiated largely for domestic political reasons, diversionary conflicts may occur when there is no security threat. 17Leo Hazlewood, "Externalizing Systemic Stress: International Conflict as Adaptive Behavior," in Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics, ed. Jonathan Wilkenfield (New York: David McKay, 1973), 173. Hazlewood also argues that a high "capacity to coerce" and high turmoil are related to diplomatic conflict and war. 18John Mueller, "Public Support for Military Ventures Abroad: Evidence From the Polls," in The Real Lessons of the Vietnam War: Reflections Twenty-Five Years After the Fall of Saigon, ed. John Norton Moore and Robert F. Turner (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2002), 188. 19Paul Corner and Giovanna Procacci, "The Italian Experience of 'Total' Mobilization, 1915–1920," in State, Society, and Mobilization During the First World War, ed. John Horne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 231. 20Arthur Stein, The Nation at War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 87. 21For a discussion of the costs of repression, see Christian Davenport, "Multidimensional Threat Perception and State Repression: An Inquiry into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions," American Journal of Political Science 39 (August 1995): 683–713. 22See Alexander L. George. "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979), 48; Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 228. 23For the application of the policy alternatives approach to additional cases, see Amy Oakes, "States in Crisis: How Governments Respond to Domestic Unrest" (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, March 2006). 24See Rubén O. Moro, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas (New York: Praeger, 1989), 7; Gary W. Wynia, Argentina: Illusions and Realities (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), 10; and Oscar Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum, Eduardo van der Kooy, Falklands: The Secret Plot (Surry, UK: Preston Editions, 1987), 32. 25It is important to emphasize here that the purpose of this case study is to identify the cause(s) of the junta's initial decision to invade the Falklands, that is, to identify the necessary or sufficient conditions of this government's plan to invade this particular target at this moment in time. One can conceive of a number of rival causal schemes that could have resulted in an invasion. More important still, one can imagine alternate scenarios in which the state's extractive capacity was high, domestic unrest was minimal or non-existent, and Argentina still invaded the Falklands. Because other conditions could have produced the same or a similar outcome, one identifies a cause as necessary or sufficient knowing that it was not in any ultimate sense either necessary or sufficient. Yet this predicament can be escaped. One can reasonably claim that a cause was necessary or sufficient as long as one fully specifies the background factors that form the context in which the event occurred. Put differently, a condition can be necessary or sufficient in a particular context. If the escalating domestic unrest in Argentina and the state's low extractive capacity were necessary or sufficient for the junta to decide to invade the Falklands, we must describe, as much as possible, the background against which these factors assumed causal importance. This is not only required in order to produce a complete explanation of Argentina's invasion of the Falklands but also to identify which necessary conditions may be generalizable to other cases. It will enable one to distinguish, as much as possible, between those conditions that were necessary given the context in which the junta acted and those that might be necessary conditions for any government to initiate a diversionary conflict in any place and at any time. For further discussion, see John Gerring, Social Science Methodology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 149–51. For a discussion of the dangers and utility of the logic of necessary and sufficient condition for the analysis of individual cases, see Gary Goertz and Harvey Starr, "Introduction: Necessary Condition Logics, Research Design, and Theory," in Necessary Conditions: Theory, Methodology, and Applications, ed. Gary Goertz and Harvey Starr (Lanham: Rowman and Gary Goertz, "The Substantive Importance of Necessary Condition Hypotheses," in Necessary Conditions. 26The simplest explanation, however, is that the military government decided to invade the Falklands simply for the glory of achieving a victory over a great power—Britain—and of retaking a territory of great symbolic importance. Although there is some evidence to support this claim, it does not explain the timing of the invasion. Galtieri and Anaya had been in power for some time (though Galtieri had not been president) before seriously considering an invasion. The decision to claim the Falklands was made in late 1981 when the unrest reached a fever pitch. See Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic (Jefferson: McFarland, 1998), 72–73; Arthur Gavshon and Desmond Rice, The Sinking of the Belgrano (London: Secker and Warburg, 1984), 57; Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, 69. 27See Gibran, The Falklands War, 65–66; Paul Eddy and Magnus Linklater, The Falklands War (London: Andre Deutsch, 1982), 29. 28Gibran, The Falklands War, 66. 29See also Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule (London: Verso Editions, 1984), 15; Luis Alberto Romero, A History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 2002), 242. 30Britain's decision to lift its sanctions against and sell arms to the Chilean government appeared to confirm the junta's suspicions. See Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (Boston: Faber and Faber, 1990), 11. 31See Eddy and Linklater, The Falklands War, 28. 32A few weeks after coming to Galtieri that was to a with which that any be to the International of See and (London: 1982), and The for the Falklands (London: Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, 22. Falkland Islands of a of Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, The Falklands and Argentina's 1998), See also Virginia The War: A for Crisis (Boston: Alexander and Foreign Policy (New York: 1984), Moro, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, 7; Wynia, Argentina, 10; Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, 32. is some evidence that the were of Argentina's plan to the The junta and that Britain not its at the it a for the the junta was when the than See The Society, and Politics in Argentina (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), and The for the Falklands, and Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, and "Diversionary by Argentina in the Malvinas in The of ed. Manus Midlarsky (New York: and "Diversionary Smith, and the Crisis of Political University Press, 1989), Romero, A History of Argentina, Paul "The and Military in The History and ed. and H. and The in Argentina Praeger, 2002), A History of Argentina, Argentina, this same it was that Galtieri Anaya that invade the Falklands if the for the is, however, no such a was For on of this issue, see Wynia, Argentina, and The for the Falklands, The Falklands Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, of Power: Institutions and Relations in Argentina (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1997), See also David "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina, Journal of Studies and World 1985): The and Rice, The Sinking of the See also and Smith, Eddy and Linklater, The Falklands War, is that the junta as its the only policy that also to public of the government. there was an interaction between the domestic unrest and the conflict the After the domestic unrest to and the junta the the military the for the public to its dissatisfaction with the government's and "Diversionary and A History of Argentina, The Falklands War, Dabat and Lorenzano, Argentina, and The and The for the Falklands, 48; Eddy and Linklater, The Falklands War, Romero, A History of Argentina, Moro, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, Wynia, Argentina, Paul "The and Military Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, The that The Falklands, the and (London: 1987), A number of scholars argue that domestic a in the decision to See Smith, The War, National The of the Falklands Crisis (New York: Praeger, 1989), of Power, Gavshon and Rice, The Sinking of the The Argentina, Galtieri Domestic what leaders to is difficult to the leaders do not In in which government decision is in and the may not freely on the of the the of leaders is a As a result, one may be to from evidence that is often We can analyze the made by those in the that these public and comments are often intended to a In the one can to a based on a of the as See also of or that Galtieri 9; Past the of The New Times, The of J. Argentina, and World in Eddy and Linklater, The Falklands War, 28. Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, and Rice, The Sinking of the The War, and Romero, A History of Argentina, and The for the Falklands, Wynia, Argentina, Romero, A History of Argentina, Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, in on 13 Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, The War, The of Argentina: and (Boulder: Westview Press, 87. Argentina: Economic 1 1985), a state's ability to national the is Jacek Kugler and Marina of extractive capacity. Kugler and Arbetman the of each government could based on the They then identify states that are or than at If a government to the based on the of its a state a of than that the government did than to the of its national Kugler and Arbetman Argentina an extractive capacity of in 1981 and in See Kugler and Arbetman, "Relative Political See also and Kugler, The War Argentina, A History of Argentina, "The Fall of Military Rule in 66. Argentina, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, 87. This is by the that after the government faced a in to Argentina's in the Falklands, it a for also to the hope that, if they Argentina's they might be to as additional necessary conditions is a if the of unrest and extractive capacity is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the junta's decision to the Falkland this may be an to it is one causal explanation is sufficient conditions one or a complete of are that a condition or of conditions is necessary to cause an event may be to than a explanation, one necessary conditions to have what one is attempting to a complete explanation of an event may only a cause if it is necessary and sufficient. I to identify the conditions that were sufficient to cause Argentina's invasion of the Falklands. The Falklands See also Romero, A History of Argentina, Gibran, The Falklands War, Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 10; A. Approaches to the the to Violence International Argentina, Although the war to be a with it is not difficult to see why Argentina's leaders might have In the to the decision to Britain the of from the South which was its only in the and the of the in South which was its only on South and the South these that if a was of this was and The for the Falklands, See also John of an (London: 2002), The Falklands and The for the Falklands, this decision was only after of the had been to the junta did not to the islands in The junta was to its plan for invasion by after on South to for their and an one could argue that the military might have been for an invasion had it place in or as That the for the of a plan to the islands against a is not to suggest that Britain was a military Argentina was to on if Argentina had been to additional the have been even See Gavshon and Rice, The Sinking of the The Falklands to but on Gavshon and Rice, The Sinking of the Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, The Falklands South Atlantic Conflict of A Study of Military Research for the and Social and Rice, The Sinking of the "The South Atlantic Conflict: and in The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, and International ed. Alberto and (Boston: George & 1985), in Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, Falkland Islands policy the in to the that Argentina had been a The Falklands was then of the and a of the military government, also made a very on in the After one was as and to a See The Falklands Cardoso, Kirschbaum, van der Kooy, Falklands, "The States Role in the Malvinas Crisis, and in Argentina's Decision to to Journal of Studies and World 1985): The that the States or even with Argentina of Britain, its was a of and A between and the of state for American is to have been in the junta's of the likely on a conflict between Argentina and the After to a on the of Argentina's Falkland Islands that policy toward the was that had not given Argentina a to I to was that we were on the but that we they on with the with the The (London: 1989), (emphasis in the original). See also Wynia, Argentina, Smith, and The for the Falklands, Cardoso, Kirschbaum, van der Kooy, Falklands, and in the South and "The Foreign in in the South the American Britain the war. See Lawrence Britain and the Falklands War (London: Britain and the Falklands War, and Rice, The Sinking of the in Gavshon and Rice, The Sinking of the and Rice, The Sinking of the and The for the Falklands, Eddy and Linklater, The Falklands War, Romero, A History of Argentina, Moro, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, Wynia, Argentina, Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, Political include the War the War the War World War I and the War For a discussion of the domestic of these and other see Blainey, The Causes of Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of A Study of War (Chicago: Chicago University Press, Mayer, and War in in Europe, ed. for Studies,