Turkey’s adaptation to NATO (1952–62): elusive pursuit for security and prosperity

This article examines Turkey’s early NATO membership (1952–1962), arguing that differences between U.S. and British strategic priorities and Turkey’s economic expectations shaped alliance outcomes. Using a triangular Turkey – United States – Britain framework, it situates NATO within shifting regional power dynamics and highlights the interplay of alliance, geostrategic, and domestic factors. We posit that while the United States and Britain framed the alliance in predominantly in security terms, Ankara attached growing importance to economic assistance. Meanwhile, the shifting Anglo-American balance of influence and critical episodes such as the Jupiter missile crisis revealed the limits of alliance cohesion. It presents NATO as a contested rather than cohesive framework. The study contributes to Cold War alliance literature and underscores its contemporary relevance amid ongoing transatlantic tensions over burden-sharing, strategic alignment and alliance cohesion.