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Existing research suggests that rebel group mergers typically force at least one side to abandon its group identity and come under the control of another organization. This loss of autonomy binds a group's fate to others, undermining its capacity for independent action. Still, some groups merge, either by joining another armed organization or establishing a new one together, even though other forms of alliance, such as joint operations or united fronts, may address their minimum cooperation needs without risking group autonomy. This behavior raises a puzzling question: what leads these groups to merge despite the associated risks? In this study, I examine the conditions under which rebel groups merge rather than rely on alternative alliances. I argue that mergers are more likely when groups face two heightened external threats that require an immediate response: increasing state repression and inter-rebel fighting. Using cross-national dyadic data and a series of multilevel logistic regression models, I find strong support for my main hypotheses. Simultaneous escalations involving state forces, rival rebel organizations, or both make rebel groups more inclined to merge, trading autonomy for greater security.
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Sedef A. Topal (2026) studied this question.
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