Of Logic and Liberation

Violence as a force for liberation was fundamental to the thought of Frantz Fanon. His critics have often rejected this notion as a myth, if not simplistic as a passionate diatribe against French rule in Algeria and without significance as applied elsewhere (Capuya, 1965; Van Dan Haag, 1966; Klein, 1966; Burke, 1976). Many admirers, on the other hand, describe Fanon as espousing a defensive violence with a revolutionary message relevant to oppressed peoples everywhere (Africanus, 1967; Worsley, 1969). While the present article intends no decisive settlement of this debate, it is guided by the belief that the logic of Fanon's arguments has been surprisingly neglected throughout the literature about him. The few substantial efforts that have examined Fanon's views on violence have either focused narrowly upon one argument or another (Issacs, 1965; Nghe, 1963; Arendt, 1969) or explored his views so broadly as to provide inadequate reference to his acceptance of terrorism (McDade, 1971; Lucas, 1971; Caute, 1970; Geismar, 1971; Perinham, 1978). While a narrow focus may provide some useful insights, the logical impact of general assumptions may be lost sight of. Conversely, a broad focus on violence may fail to show how Fanon's underlying assumptions are logically linked to (and may even require him to accept) his conclusions regarding the class of violent action that is terrorist.