China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism

T wo watershed events frame China's current vulnerability to minority separatism: first, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its client states from 1989-91, and second, the U.S. war against terrorism that was prompted by the events of September 11, 2001. The first of these encouraged minority separatism; the second facilitated the efforts of the Chinese government to deal with it. Prior to 1989, ethnic discontents regularly simmered just below the surface with occasional outbursts. While grievances are many and often interact synergistically, most fall into four broad categories: religious/cultural, resource distribution, discrimination, and self-governance. Three geographic areas in particular were chronically restive: Xinjiang, Tibet, and, to a lesser extent, Inner Mongolia. All three are designated autonomous regions rather than provinces, but dissidents among the ethnic minorities who live there have expressed ongoing annoyance that they are unable to exercise any meaningful degree of autonomy. Although party and central government portray the autonomous area system as allowing non-Han Chinese to be masters of their own homes, skeptics believe that the system was created to keep them confined in their homes.'