Phenomenology and Analytical Philosophy: Skepticism as a Theoretical Basis

The skeptical foundations of E. Husserl's phenomenology and analytical philosophy are examined using the example of the works of L. Wittgenstein. In contemporary philosophy, there is a need to search for unity or at least approximation of the two theories, both in the interpretation of certain psychological aspects of understanding human cognition and in the field of theoretical epistemology. The main goal of the work is to study the general problems of phenomenology and analytical philosophy, as it is expressed in the works of the founders and most prominent representatives. Skepticism is considered as a theoretical basis inherent in these areas of modern philosophy, which for these thinkers acts not as an end in itself, but as a balanced theoretical position that reflects real problems on the path of knowledge, especially when it comes to consciousness and mental characteristics of a person. In modern philosophy, there is a need to search for points of intersection of the two theories, both in the interpretation of certain psychological aspects of the understanding of human cognition, and in the field of the fundamental foundations of theoretical epistemology. Such a search is not only an interesting theoretical problem, but the development of philosophy in our era largely depends on the revision and reinterpretation of the conceptual apparatus of various philosophical positions. This is not only and not so much about the development of new, more adequate terms, but about the search for common starting points. The skeptical position is quite fundamental for both theories; the only question is change or coincidence of aspects. It should be noted that further research into the possibilities of combining the phenomenological and analytical traditions can be carried out within the framework of both theories, each of which has its own capabilities and provides for a change in approaches to understanding and interpreting the concept of mentality in the world of modern achievements. We are talking about a combination of these theories, both at the level of problems and at the level of methodology. In the first respect, this is certainly a question about consciousness, its characteristics and mental states of man. No less relevant is the question of the status of logical-mathematical models of reality. Of course, such complex issues are not without significant differences. For Husserl, mathematics is an eidetic science, i.e. devoid of a natural attitude, as well as phenomenology, with the difference that mathematical discourse deals with extremely formal objects. For early analytical philosophy, mathematics is an area of formal-logical relations, a special logical-semantic game, the rules of which are established conventionally. Regarding methodology, we should talk about systematic skepticism of the theories under consideration, and this skepticism is not only implied, but also directly declared, as we are going to show in this article. Here it is enough to point out the Husserlian principle of the era - abstinence from judgment, developed already in ancient skepticism. As for Wittgenstein, his skeptical attitude has long been the subject of debate and is hardly in doubt. In E. Husserl's consideration, pure consciousness is revealed as a result of the implementation of phenomenological reductions – consistent abstention from any recognition of the reality of the world of phenomena, bracketing out all elements of reality, even non-eidetic elements of consciousness itself. For consciousness to exist as a temporal flow of our intentions, there is no need for any real existence. Phenomenology asserts that the existence of objects is not a necessity – it is, in a certain respect, random in nature. The following is implied here: it can always be that the further course of experience will force one to abandon what was its basis. Thus, between mental acts and reality there is a boundary of uncertainty. The very fact of the existence of consciousness cannot be determined by the existence of nature. The latter, from the standpoint of phenomenology, exists only as ordered and systematized by acts of consciousness. It is this constitution that is precisely the intentional activity of consciousness to form its own objectivity as noematic structures. Wittgenstein deploys his skepticism as a consistent theoretical approach, moreover, his skepticism has several levels and often concerns his own beliefs and statements. Although not unambiguous, this approach to understanding skepticism is very close to the very spirit of phenomenology with its abstinence from judgments about the reality or unreality of the surrounding world, a question that is consistently raised in the brackets of philosophical discourse.