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These two contributions to the ongoing story of intertextual theory and criticism are diametrically opposed in their approaches and in that way bear witness to the persistence of the concept of intertextuality. Jessica Mason, in Intertextuality in Practice, brings together contemporary versions of stylistic analysis with narratology and with cognitive poetics to look specifically at the way in which readers employ intertextual strategies in compiling and communicating their readings to others. Mason spends little time engaging with the history of theoretical debate that the concept has produced since it was coined by Julia Kristeva in 1967, preferring instead to focus on the pragmatics of reading itself. In fact, Mason is quite dismissive of the theoretical tradition, explaining that “none of this work [the history of theoretical debate on intertextuality] offers a conceptualisation that can be operationalised as a framework for practical analysis, as the field is typically preoccupied with ‘what counts’ as intertextuality conceptually, rather than how its manifestations in written and spoken discourse can be identified, described and analysed” (1). Mason's approach is to describe how narrative interrelations and intertextual references work. The former are defined as “the cognitive act of making a link between a narrative and at least one other” and the latter as “any articulated, examinable product of narrative interrelation” (21). Beginning with a study of the “book talk” (of readers’ posts in Amazon.co.uk and Libarything.org) about E. I. James's Fifty Shades of Grey and the Twilight novel series by Stephanie Meyer, she fleshes out a methodology for analyzing intertextual connections within texts (James's novel, as we know, is based partly on the series of adolescent novels by Meyer), along with those connections introduced by readers themselves. For example, when she is describing schemas (“an individual's version of a text in the mind”), Mason writes: Over the course of a lifetime, every person will accrue a whole host of narrative schemas. Within the narrative interrelation framework this will be termed the mental archive. The narrative schemas forming the contents of an individual's mental archive represent the potential store of information with which the reader may identify an interrelation when reading a new narrative. An accurate depiction of an individual's mental archive would then be a complete inventory of all stories encountered: some schemas holistic and general, others narrow and highly accurate. These schemas will shift in form and nature over time and with concentration. This is the true context into which new narratives enter: a library where everything looks exactly as the reader remembers it. (72)This approach treats the reader's relation to the intertextual field as so much data to be mined, recorded, and then compared to other sets of data. It has, then, little relation to any theoretical rendering of intertextuality, be it poststructuralist, structuralist, formalist, or any of the various approaches which contribute to the “tradition” of intertextual theory. Indeed, such a book might be useful outside its own constituency in reminding us that at this stage of intellectual history there is indeed a tradition of intertextual theory. Mason even goes so far as to argue that “an account of intertextuality in practice . . . cannot rely on Saussure, Bakhtin, or Kristeva, in the search for identifying observable instances” (5–6). For anyone who is influenced by and would take seriously the “tradition” I have just mentioned, that statement must appear deeply depressing.Scarlett Baron's study, The Birth of Intertextuality, brings us to more familiar ground. Her approach, in fact, is to produce a genealogy of that very “tradition,” expanding it, as she goes, to include the influence of Charles Darwin, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. What she shares with Mason is the sense that confusion and controversy rather than a stable methodological approach have been the main products of that tradition. Baron highlights four main “areas of confusion” which bedevil the modern concept of intertextuality. They are 1) the question of whether intertextuality is a universal or historically specific term; 2) the role of the author in intertextual analysis; 3) what Baron, after Michael Riffaterre, calls “the referential fallacy” (the idea that texts can ever directly refer to the world rather than to other texts); and 4) whether intertextuality is “a theory of literary production or literary reception” (25). The genealogical history which Baron moves on to is not designed to solve these issues but to provide us with greater understanding of where they come from and why they find a home within the theory of intertextuality.Baron's first port of call in her genealogical story is the monumental figure of Charles Darwin. As she states, “Evolution turns a world of bounded, straightforwardly apprehensible objects into a world of processes without discrete beginnings or endings” (56). The genealogical branch that matters most here takes us from Henri Bergson to T. S. Eliot and his essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919). Baron's journey through the intricacies and contradictions of Bergson's theories provides a fascinating bridge between Darwin and Eliot's own ideas of creative evolution. It is Eliot's love of Bergson's philosophy, and yet, in his famous essay on tradition, his rejection of Bergson's atheism, that, according to Baron, creates the massive contradictions in his theoretical essays of that period.Pushing on to more modern visions of creation and evolution that do not rely on the figure of the tree (of life) still favored by Darwin in his work, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's figure of the rhizome, or the rhetorical figure of anastomosis, Baron shows how the influence of Darwin's theory of evolution can be seen to parallel the “nebulous unease” which “the notion of intertextuality still arouses in some” (88). She writes: “Intertextuality stands sharply at odds with . . . theological thinking: as a theory which repudiates intentionality, it rides on the crest of a wave of atheistic currents—Darwinian theory and Nietzschean philosophy preeminent among them—which gathered momentum in the nineteenth century” (109). Moving to Nietzsche's influence on the poststructuralist coiners of the term intertextuality brings us to more familiar ground. Baron rightly calls Nietzsche a “dominant intellectual point of reference” in France in the late 1960s. For example, in Roland Barthes's famous essay on the death of the author, we see Barthes revisiting Nietzsche's declaration of the death of God and we see him replicating the rhetorically persuasive aspects of Nietzsche's writing and thought. However, Baron's reading concludes with a critique of French Nietzsche, as it were, in that the use of him by Jacques Derrida, Barthes, Kristeva, Michel Foucault, and others follows his celebration of plurality while evading his attempted resolution of this “problem” through a balancing celebration of “hierarchy.” Baron writes: “Barthes and Foucault shroud half his [Nietzsche's] story in silence. Intertextuality parts ways with Nietzsche in privileging relativism over hierarchy. While Nietzsche's deconstructive labour is figured as a step on the road to reconstruction and decisive interpretation in the ‘grand style,’ the intertextualists give birth to readers whose interpretations are all of equal value” (190). Whatever we may think of such a partial reading of poststructuralist approaches to interpretation (for instance, we might place it by the side of Derrida's “Structure, Style, and Play” essay), it is clear from the rhetoric of Baron's own writing that an implicit argument is being promoted within her genealogical narrative. In her concluding chapter, Baron finally confronts the tension she has been gradually describing in the poststructuralist project. She does this through a sustained critique of Kristeva. The core of this critique lies in her Nietzsche-inspired dissolution of the creative subject within an infinite field of textuality. She writes: “Kristeva misleadingly associates Bakhtin with her own belief in the dissolution of the subject in writing, erroneously attributing to him an anti-subjective, anti-referential outlook he did not espouse. . . . Bakhtin shows no investment in the ‘death of the subject,’ the deconsecrated ‘I,’ or the renunciation of the ‘ideological principle of identity’ ” (331). On the strength of this initial critique of her account of Bakhtin's dialogism, Baron proceeds to run through the hybridity of Kristeva's writing, particularly in her “Word, Dialogue, Novel” essay of 1967. Structuralist, formalist, psychoanalytical, philosophical, linguistic, mathematical, and biological discourses come together to create what Baron styles as the “excessive, befuddling circularity” of Kristeva's style (330).As others have shown elsewhere, however, Kristeva's writing in the late 1960s keeps company with other tel quel writers in their war against the bourgeois values behind notions of readability and communication. To arrange her book so as to imply that the tensions evident in the genealogical prehistory of intertextuality are created or caused by Kristeva's own writing style in 1967, and in so doing mark Kristeva as the source of the concept's future fate, seems questionable and somewhat unconvincing. Baron writes: The immediate contexts of intertextuality's emergence—the cultural, theoretical, and personal influences which shaped Kristeva's views of language and literature in the run-up to her first use of the term in “Word, Dialogue, and Novel”—have a great deal to do with the polysemy which has characterized the notion over its fifty-year history. What emerges most strikingly from a consideration of her early essays . . . is the sheer variety of the materials they seek to yoke together. While this heterogeneity reflects the intellectual excitement Kristeva experienced in the years following her arrival in Paris, the diversity—and the logical inconsistency it introduces—does not make for easy reading or facilitate the application of the essay's theoretical ideas to critical practice. The pullulating metaphorical range of Kristeva's own glosses . . . renders the notion plural and paradoxical from the outset. (343)The account of Kristeva's style may be correct, but the implications of that account are themselves multiple and troubling. It would appear, for example, that Kristeva is a bad mother of the concept because she gave birth (to the concept of intertextuality) in the wrong, malforming way. Like Mason before her, Baron pays too little attention to Barthes's role in the initial definition and dissemination of the concept in works such as S/Z. It also becomes clear that, like Mason, Baron is nostalgic for a clean, practically useful, and universally agreed-on methodology for reading. Perhaps part of the downplaying of Barthes is due to the fact that he does produce a relatively clear and reproducible method of reading in his textual analysis.If Kristeva's greatest crime was to give birth to a pullulating concept (crowded, spreading, multiplying), then whether one will be prompted to praise or blame her depends on how clear a sky one wants. It is unclear how Baron views the future of intertextuality, which she concludes by claiming for the grand antifoundational tradition of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and as a term that “need be no cause for alarm” (346). That those descriptions will seem contradictory to some, while to others they will appear the acme of reason, is perhaps the most telling point against both these studies.
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Graham Allen (2021) studied this question.
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