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A conflict elite emerged in Syria amidst metastasizing violence and economic contraction. This conflict elite began as economic intermediaries before taking on major roles in Syria’s war economy as well as positions of nominal political power on the boards of major chambers’ and holding companies. In these roles, many funded and controlled private militias to support the regime’s battlefield strategy. A Russian-led de-militiafication programme transitioned these militias into private security companies (PSCs) after 2015. In this paper, I ask several questions about how the conflict elite that emerged was funnelled towards the operations of PSCs as part of a larger regime strategy of conflict management and survival and what their roles tell us about state-business relations. I argue that PSCs provided opportunities for rent distribution that allowed the regime to foster and marshall a loyalist elite towards conflict management goals. The PSCs embed conflict elites, current and former security officials, and military leaders into entanglements that blur the lines between public and private, conflict and security. In intermediating between conflict and security, PSCs serve an important role in the regime’s conflict management strategies.
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Samer Abboud (2025) studied this question.
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