What does this research mean for the field?

Introducing financing reshapes the trade-in preferences of manufacturers and platforms under agency selling, with manufacturers generally preferring platform financing and banks preferring platform implementation of trade-ins. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.INCREMENTAL. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.NEUTRAL.

What question did this study set out to answer?

Investigate how financing sources and trade-in operational roles interact to influence equilibrium decisions, channel profits, and consumer preferences under agency selling.

August 19, 2026SystemsOpen Access

The Interplay of Financing and Trade-In Implementation Under Agency Selling

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Authors

DJDongfeng JiaNanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications

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Implication

Game-theoretic modeling reveals equilibrium shifts under trade-in and financing choices in agency selling, indicating distinct strategic preferences across supply chain members.

Key Points

Investigate how financing sources and trade-in operational roles interact to influence equilibrium decisions, channel profits, and consumer preferences under agency selling.
Formulated and analytically solved four game-theoretic supply chain models combining two financing options (bank vs. platform) with two trade-in implementers (manufacturer vs. platform).
Conducted comparative statics and numerical analyses across replacement and primary consumer segments, with extensions addressing government trade-in subsidies and positive initial manufacturer capital.
Rankings across financing channels depend primarily on cost structures, whereas comparisons between trade-in implementers remain structurally stable.
The manufacturer largely favors platform financing, while the bank consistently prefers platform-led trade-in implementation.
Consumer utility is maximized under platform financing when the manufacturer runs the trade-in program, but shifts toward manufacturer implementation under platform financing.

Cite This Study

Dongfeng Jia (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a85630603308d306e2d5f6f https://doi.org/10.3390/systems14080999

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Implication

Game-theoretic modeling reveals equilibrium shifts under trade-in and financing choices in agency selling, indicating distinct strategic preferences across supply chain members.

The Interplay of Financing and Trade-In Implementation Under Agency Selling

Discussion

Member takes

Implication

Key Points

Cite This Study

The Interplay of Financing and Trade-In Implementation Under Agency Selling

Discussion

Member takes

Implication

Key Points

Cite This Study

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