Rethinking moral claim rights

The notion of rights is ubiquitous in philosophical discourse. As Allen Buchanan put it over thirty years ago, ‘Future historians of moral and political philosophy may well label our period the Age of Rights’.1 This notion is not only popular, but also complex. As the legal scholar W. N. Hohfeld famously suggested, rights are susceptible to multiple interpretations: they can be claims, liberties, powers, or immunities.2 Despite this variation, the consensus view is that the core instance of a right is a claim right.3 In the moral domain, claim rights designate a binary relation between a right-holder and a duty-bearer, where the former stands in a distinctive moral position vis-à-vis the latter.4 While there is controversy as to what, precisely, this distinctive moral position amounts to, the idea that claim rights capture it is seldom put into question. In this article, I challenge this way of thinking. I argue that the language of claim rights is ill suited for the purpose of picking out a distinctive moral position.5 I show that the notion of a claim right is susceptible to several disambiguations, just as the notion of a right itself is. From this, I conclude that we should either no longer appeal to the concept of a claim right in moral theorizing or rethink its purpose. The article proceeds as follows. In Section II, I set out two desiderata that a plausible definition of moral claim rights should satisfy. The definition should: (a) capture a distinctive moral position and (b) account for paradigmatic instances of claim rights in our ordinary language. In Section III, I show that the two most prominent accounts of claim rights fail to meet desideratum (b). Of course, the fact that prominent accounts are unsatisfactory does not mean that no satisfactory account could be developed. To support this stronger claim, in Section IV, I offer a systematization of our language of claim rights. I suggest that the greatest common denominator of such language is the idea of empowerment, and show that paradigmatic statements about claim rights track either the justification for certain forms of empowerment (justification rights statements) or empowerment itself and the particular status it confers on individuals (status rights statements). As I explain in Section V, this twofold connection between claim rights and empowerment reveals that, for structural reasons, our desiderata cannot be jointly satisfied. No notion of claim rights can both capture justification as well as status rights statements and pick out a distinctive moral position. In Section VI, I consider three possible implications of this conclusion. One is that we should abandon the notion of claim rights in moral theorizing. Another, less drastic possibility is that, in light of its disjunctive structure, the notion of claim rights should be given a different purpose. A third possibility, for those not persuaded by my arguments, is to treat my discussion as setting out a challenge that any satisfactory account of moral claim rights should meet. Section VII concludes. Before I start, let me make some clarifications. My discussion focuses on claim rights in moral theorizing specifically, where the notion is assumed to capture a distinctive moral position. As I shall explain towards the end of the article, the ambiguities that make the notion of claim rights ill suited for this purpose in moral theorizing also render it a powerful tool of political advocacy. I remain silent about the suitability of claim rights for the technical purposes of legal reasoning. Since those are, plausibly, different from the purposes of moral philosophy, the concerns raised in this article need not extend to the legal domain. Finally, a note on my terminology. In what follows, I shall treat ‘claim rights’, ‘directed duties’ (the violation of which wrongs particular others), and ‘duties owed to others’, as equivalent. This terminological choice is in line with standard use in the literature.6 An evaluation of claim rights presupposes an account of the work we want this notion to do in moral theorizing. If no plausible definition that does that job can be found, we will have reason to doubt the usefulness of the concept, at least with respect to the originally intended purpose. For an analogy, consider a society with a conceptual scheme different from ours, in which there are only two types of cutlery: forks and spives. Forks are defined in the familiar way, as tools for picking up solid food. The concept of a spife is disjunctive: it points either to tools for scooping liquid food or to tools for cutting solid food. We want these concepts to help us effectively select different ‘tools for eating’. As it happens, two kinds of objects fit into the category ‘spives’: what we (in our world) call spoons and knives. In this parallel society, when asking for a spife, one may have in mind either what we call a spoon or what we call a knife. Without further specification, one may therefore end up getting something one did not want. The category ‘spife’, it seems, is a recipe for confusion: it does not help us select our tools efficiently. Instead of having one concept—‘tools to either scoop liquid food or cut solid food’—it would be much better to have two: ‘spoons’ for liquid food and ‘knives’ for solid food. This would be a reason to abandon the concept of a spife, at least for the purpose of selecting specific pieces of cutlery. If, mutatis mutandis, the concept of claim rights were similarly unable to do the work we want it to do in moral theorizing, we would have reason to abandon it, at least for that purpose. So, what work do we want claim rights to do in moral theorizing? Claim rights, as I have noted in the Introduction, are meant to designate a distinctive moral position that some (that is, right-holders) hold vis-à-vis others (that is, duty-bearers). Claim-rights relations are ‘bipolar’, in the sense of always involving two relata: a duty-bearer on the one hand, and a claim-right-holder on the other.7 Each pole within the relation is marked by distinctive attributes. One pole bears duties: she is bound by certain oughts. The other pole possesses correlative rights. This, in turn, puts her in a special moral position vis-à-vis the corresponding duties, which are owed to her and the violation of which wrongs her. To be a claim-right-holder, then, is ‘more’ than being the mere beneficiary of someone's duty. A good definition of claim rights must elucidate what this ‘more’ precisely amounts to: what it means to have a claim (or, equivalently, to be owed a and be by its In a good definition of claim rights should account for paradigmatic rights This is a familiar As puts it, rights fit with ordinary language as a standard of as that ordinary are an for theorizing about rights and This is not to that a definition of claim rights must fit instance of rights language is and a good account of claim rights for the purposes of moral may well a use of this than we in our definition to paradigmatic rights we would have to what we are is the special moral position with the language of claim rights, and not something on ordinary language the that the idea of a claim right is a of by Hohfeld to different of in the In ordinary we about rights not about any in So, are we to instances of the notion of that pick out claim rights This an to our for two of our rights statements of claim rights at For we that individuals have rights to a of and other that they are owed to such is we can that some are to the corresponding duties, that some claim rights are being to any rights is meant to claim rights, we can of the right would the right-holder in as to being If our are that in the is intended to mean ‘claim moral position. The definition the view that to be a right-holder the of a may be by its is to in a distinctive moral position vis-à-vis with paradigmatic The definition our core statements about it rights to those As will both desiderata In I it is discussion about claim rights is by the between will and In what follows, I these in relation to our two will over some familiar this may a it for my in us with the will by and For the will to have a moral claim right is to the moral to (that is, to its it, and for its This definition an of the of is owed to its is in some sense and when something is I have over The will not only but also desideratum a distinctive moral the to what about desideratum as have famously the some in that it the will a for for over a for rights the cannot account for the rights of as with and such a is the no for rights. for the will to have a right just is to have the to a the to it, is, rights that cannot be a conceptual In the will desideratum but with desideratum (b). me to its to the by to have a right is to an to The much is to suggest that a is owed to me when my is to its to to and to fit the the of an that a can be as a distinctive moral position. possesses it stands in a special relation with respect to the The desideratum the will it to meet desideratum (b). there are several by that do not to to rights, the my to an is to the If I to help and can do at I to do most would that the a claim right to be by me in the way my a claim right that I for the I from this My a of and the beneficiary in this is this to a as others me have also there are where someone's right to cannot be by appeal to in the rights. For consider my right over a to me by a I have in the it I put it at the of a some years and have about any plausible of the my in the is not to others not to One may that the is not in the but in being the one what to do with it is a in as there are in which do not mind and have no reason to mind it is, no is In such it seems, an must conclude that I have no way out of this that, I may have in this particular with in society, have an in there being a of is not by appeal to the of particular but by by the common are where the and the are that is, is a way of and by the is In such the of my is by that of my rights. While this may the to the it does at the of it unable to desideratum what not to my are not my but my as well as the common from the of the I can no longer be to in a distinctive moral position in relation to those it to those duties, my are no than This me as a to than just the of In the will and desideratum to a distinctive moral position. also have desideratum (b). My in these not to a of in these to the will and have for a and the to be between these two with on either or to the I do that a can me the will the a account of claim rights, by our two In as others me have the to have a this is and the the will and are bound to extend to as will be my in the the with will and us to the conceptual of A good systematization of this must be to the three there to be something that we would be unable to claim rights always will and must be the right would be the conceptual of must be to explain these to capture some core rights My as I will accounts for three that moral in its core is to the idea of empowerment to This is the common of The empowerment may on the at hand, and in different forms of over as the to and to and to for our language of claim rights empowerment in two the one hand, we can about claim rights on the justification for the moral there are to From this a such as a moral claim right to is for certain forms of for A or for other to to the other hand, we can about claim rights on the forms of empowerment that are in any given an status individuals From this status a such as a moral claim right to is for is to to in to, for that not not to in of and those have the to, for that not not to in of and those statements about claim rights are susceptible to both one is most will on the and at For rights may be as justification to the certain forms of empowerment to be to a certain of for the and may to forms of empowerment, that certain The fact that, for most statements about claim rights, status and justification are jointly us to about claim rights, and us the sense that language points to a This, is not and the forms of empowerment with language need not always For there may be in which are the right not to be or where to would not be when rights are While claim rights empowerment, then, they do not the forms of and there are some paradigmatic instances of claim rights which can only be sense of from either a status or a justification are statements where the of and the of status In such instances of ordinary language rights in the individuals empowerment, and other in the an The former are by but not by For the the is the statements that, in our language of claim rights, two the justification of empowerment and empowerment To this, consider the have moral claim rights to This can be as a that in to to it that those to with this an from a status The view that should be in relation to is to as we have cannot have the to may that but the or the From a status we cannot that have a right to For to the have a moral claim right to the to me by my From a status this can be as that I to, for that others not the in of and when we to this as a we is just not that my in and that I should in relation to statements are ill suited to rights is not by the of what ordinary language as the but by the of society as a in the of certain for a To is by a common to empowerment to duties, and our language of rights such empowerment in two by the between and statements about claim rights are susceptible to both status and justification us the that a this is, in My systematization of the language of claim rights is, I in several from what of claim rights have in it us the of the will and sense of these and it is for any definition of claim rights to both of our In what follows, I on these While the accounts for the core concerns the will those by This, I to an of our rights language. the is in several and my us the on the justification of to the justification of empowerment to those for its of for that rights in of mere as it rights with for duties, than with empowerment to duties, the is unable to account for rights statements we can only make sense of from a status my right over the to the will this is better to make sense of status it into for two as we have the forms of empowerment with claim rights are and need not always be for in the of that such forms of empowerment always the will rights. by not to the for empowerment, the is unable to capture those statements we can only make sense of from a justification As my not only us the with prominent of rights, but also reveals that such are bound to extend to any to claim rights in line with the two desiderata at the of this The can be most effectively by that and statements rights, as a moral in different statements in the individuals empowerment, and it is an as to which of empowerment is most in any given by claim rights in the individuals certain forms of The fact that the individuals empowerment and the individuals are need not always of rights and with the fact that empowerment can several different forms that need not always be it to a definition of claim rights that both core instances of use and out a distinctive moral If we want to capture core we need a disjunctive definition of claim rights. a disjunctive in turn, does not to a distinctive moral but to a just as the notion of is and points to possible I have that, for structural reasons, no definition of a claim right can this notion to do the job we want it to do in moral theorizing. is no moral position that the notion of a claim right but a The idea of a claim right is not much then, than the notion of a of which it is meant to be a from I consider three and offer some in relation to My is not to one in but to show that, of the discussion should us to rethink the by much of the conceptual about claim rights. The possibility is to abandon the language of claim rights in moral theorizing. The is that language is meant to pick out a distinctive moral but cannot do the it would be better to cut it out of our moral Instead of the category of claim rights as it to a we could to the specific we have in or particular forms of empowerment In other we should not such as A have a moral claim right but should on one of the possible A have the moral to and the of A have the moral to this or that of empowerment to and this the in the society in of about spoons and use the concept of a concepts for spoons and the right way should be any different in the of claim A to these concerns is to suggest that could be by being about the definition of a right one is The it be is not with the notion of a claim but with of the notion being about what they mean by While I that this way of would the it is not that it any over the of just language. on to the language of claim rights is to language is that, will of claim rights on to is being the be about definition of a by to a when this is from what to such in the the idea that a claim right a distinctive moral position. As it this notion points to a of possible as well as to for on on those or is we is a but the remain the this with the of a it make much sense to in the me a spife, by which I mean the tool for cutting solid it is to for the The for claim rights, or one could me to the possible of my This does not the language of claim rights in moral theorizing, I have that the notion of a claim right a of that have something in there not be a purpose for a concept of this To to our analogy, both the specific concepts of and spoons and the concept of are pick out any specific tool for but a of such claim rights can a in moral theorizing. this claim rights as the of what are concepts by of and which cannot be defined a set of and From a instances of claim rights could be to be by connection to to this is the they we could between of the and on of the with the notion of a claim right any particular instance For a right to and to food would as core instances of claim rights, in these the of justification and empowerment My in my with respect to not to my in my with respect to to me with and in which the of justification and that of empowerment would as instances of claim rights. The rights of and would into this as would the rights of these are by appeal to other than The a concept of claim rights, one that the and of this the should be on it could be put to good use in moral theorizing. If there are in which to the as a is for moral the will be A further could be to consider of the of the concept of a claim one be In that we should rights language for that and a different label for the To to this analogy, in a society the concept of were of the to tools for it may be to just that are what we call and use the notion of a spoon for what is The with this is that it is not there a that is, our language is with what I have justification or status rights. to our rights such that one over the other appeal to some on which in Section would be as I have the of both the of will and I therefore not that this further is in the at this, let me note that my concerns about the of claim rights for the purposes of moral theorizing do not extend to the of may be a for moral but it is an for political advocacy. In the language of rights to of the forms of rights the over the years or in of rights, rights, rights, rights, and The of rights language explain of this In the political rights language can be as a means of to the for to statements can be as for the status can over the of forms of empowerment for the of such statements is a of the fact that they are a for where the of the may be up for statements are from a political of From a status for to have a right to is to to the are to such The of the conceptual by claim rights to make powerful in political The with claim rights that I have in the of moral theorizing, then, need not make us about this notion in the of political advocacy. to what I have just suggested, it be that the of rights language is a While can be rights the of such language also political discourse. in support of that cannot be in of rights, such as the need for in the the of and support for the This is a one that not much with the of rights language as with its the fact that some cannot be in rights language that such The is that rights are as as famously put it, as that over other So, as as concerns are concerns in other language (the language of the and the is in of the If my in this article is it that the use of rights language as a or is use of rights to empowerment to duties, to be we about for empowerment or empowerment If we are about which are If we are about empowerment what particular types of empowerment are it that to rights, to empowerment, rights language can no longer as a but a rights language an in the of political a may To put it this is that, the notion of a claim as an concept, not the purposes of moral philosophy, should we it to make a to political could explain this The in that the concept of a claim right is not it is a concept I have cannot the it to in moral that of picking out a distinctive moral position. This, does not the concept from other in moral theorizing and in political tools for and A is to treat my discussion as a challenge that any of the view that claim rights pick out a distinctive moral position should the challenge could be in either of two it could be by that, to what I have suggested, both of my desiderata can be For the in this article, I about this in the moral are to While I to have some for that the conceptual of does not for the of desiderata (a) and I must with the possibility of The article can be as an to those the challenge could be by a for some core rights statements in be ordinary language is, I not about this at least as a way of the about claim rights. My is that this would the that is, show that it is not a the controversy between will and they to a distinctive moral position and they fail to account for some core rights are we to which one claim rights, which rights statements we should that our will on our the desideratum of out a distinctive moral In this for that the is a for between of and of is right about these there to be no that can us rights to the to or to the that those in the of such a as there can be no between will and any other of rights for that analogy, there is no in asking which of a and a is purpose is to put a in the a purpose is to some a The mutatis mutandis, for claim rights. In I that the challenge I have set out can be If I I the article will be of in setting out that The language of rights, and of claim rights, is in moral theorizing. If there is one moral to at least in the it is that have a certain set of rights. to status as is meant to something special about and position vis-à-vis one I have that when we into what this position to, the idea that the notion of a claim right it The greatest common denominator of is claim rights are ill suited to capture a distinctive moral position. as this is what we want to do in moral theorizing, we should conclude that they are not fit for purpose. this means that the language of claim rights should be or is a I have I to have for the of claim rights as a moral A of this article with the in the in and to I For and I would also to and at the of the the of the the the in and the I also to the of the of and and to for I the support of the the and the are no of to this The not for this are in the