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Astri Suhrke observed in 2013 that ‘the process of defining the Afghan state will continue and, as with most state-building processes, is likely to involve an element of violence’. This proved prescient when the Taliban returned to power in 2021. Drawing on Suhrke’s extensive work, this paper analyses the new Taliban state as an endogenous state-building project emerging from a victor’s peace, rather than solely a case of rebel rule or regime survival. Using four dimensions of state formation – coercion, capital, legitimacy, and leadership – it examines how the Taliban have consolidated authority through coercive control, religious-ideological framing, symbolic performance, and a post-aid political economy. The second Emirate is presented as a distinct formation: neither a revival of the 1990s order nor a continuation of the Islamic Republic, but a clerical, centralised state shaped by two decades of insurgency and the perceived failures of externally driven models. While stabilising core functions under sanctions and isolation, enduring tensions between centralisation and local realities, ideological rigidity and pragmatic adaptation, may undermine long-term stability.
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Susanne Schmeidl (2025) studied this question.
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