Beyond weaponized interdependence: the corporate chokehold in frontier semiconductor governance

Why can states restrict adversaries’ access to frontier semiconductors yet not control the speed and continuity of production on which their own strategic capabilities depend? The article goes beyond Weaponized Interdependence while developing Corporate Infrastructural Governance through the concept of the corporate chokehold. State-leveraged chokepoints govern access to frontier technology; a corporate chokehold, the term I introduce, governs frontier production. These represent parallel yet distinct governance logics. I theorize the corporate chokehold as an operational form of private authority manifested through a double-key configuration. ASML, a Dutch company, controls the lithography tools and service regime needed to keep leading-edge fabs operating, while TSMC, a Taiwanese company, controls design qualification, advanced packaging, and capacity schedules. The empirical focus is leading-edge semiconductors and advanced packaging. A three-part diagnostic that I develop – infrastructural embedment, authority relocation, and temporal lock-in – is evaluated through theory-testing process tracing based on documentary evidence. The analysis shows that US-orchestrated restrictions toward China and corporate constraints on US and allied production operate in parallel: States alter access conditions, while firms govern whether qualified output reaches scale on schedule. Alternative explanations – onshoring, OSAT redundancy, and market competition – expand capacity without yet changing control over servicing, qualification, and production schedules.