What does this research mean for the field?

In a dual-channel supply chain with animal welfare label premiums, manufacturers will share retailer advertising costs under a Stackelberg game only if their marginal profit is sufficiently high, while centralized decision-making consistently maximizes total supply chain profit. Novelty: ClaimNovelty.INCREMENTAL. Consensus alignment: ConsensusAlignment.NEUTRAL.

What question did this study set out to answer?

To examine cooperative marketing, cost-sharing strategies, and equilibrium decisions between a manufacturer and retailer in a dual-channel supply chain driven by animal welfare label premiums.

September 6, 2026MathematicsOpen Access

Vertical Cooperative Advertising in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under the Premium Effect of Animal Welfare Labels

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Authors

GDGuangzong DingNanjing Tech University EWErpeng WangNanjing Tech University YZYun ZhangChengdu University of Information Technology

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Implication

Game-theoretic analysis reveals cost-sharing conditions in dual-channel supply chains, indicating that centralized collaboration maximizes profits under animal welfare premiums.

Key Points

To examine cooperative marketing, cost-sharing strategies, and equilibrium decisions between a manufacturer and retailer in a dual-channel supply chain driven by animal welfare label premiums.
Constructed a dual-channel supply chain model comprising one manufacturer investing in animal welfare certifications and one retailer managing local advertising campaigns.
Formulated and compared three game-theoretic decision models: a decentralized Nash non-cooperative game, a decentralized Stackelberg leader–follower game, and a centralized cooperative game.
Conducted numerical simulations to evaluate the impact of channel preferences and cost-sharing ratios on participant profitability and system efficiency.
The manufacturer provides zero advertising cost-sharing under the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium.
Under the Stackelberg game, the manufacturer shares the retailer's advertising costs when its marginal profit satisfies 2ρ1 > ρ2, yielding higher profits for both firms than the Nash model; when 2ρ1 ≤ ρ2, cost sharing drops to zero.
Centralized decision-making consistently yields higher total supply chain profits than either decentralized mode, establishing the benchmark for efficiency loss.

Cite This Study

Ding et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a9d1eb628139818eab21ccd https://doi.org/10.3390/math14173196

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September 6, 2026MathematicsOpen Access

Vertical Cooperative Advertising in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under the Premium Effect of Animal Welfare Labels

View Full Paper

Ask AI

Bookmark

Authors

GDGuangzong DingNanjing Tech University EWErpeng WangNanjing Tech University YZYun ZhangChengdu University of Information Technology

Discussion

Member takes

Implication

Game-theoretic analysis reveals cost-sharing conditions in dual-channel supply chains, indicating that centralized collaboration maximizes profits under animal welfare premiums.

Key Points

To examine cooperative marketing, cost-sharing strategies, and equilibrium decisions between a manufacturer and retailer in a dual-channel supply chain driven by animal welfare label premiums.
Constructed a dual-channel supply chain model comprising one manufacturer investing in animal welfare certifications and one retailer managing local advertising campaigns.
Formulated and compared three game-theoretic decision models: a decentralized Nash non-cooperative game, a decentralized Stackelberg leader–follower game, and a centralized cooperative game.
Conducted numerical simulations to evaluate the impact of channel preferences and cost-sharing ratios on participant profitability and system efficiency.
The manufacturer provides zero advertising cost-sharing under the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium.
Under the Stackelberg game, the manufacturer shares the retailer's advertising costs when its marginal profit satisfies 2ρ1 > ρ2, yielding higher profits for both firms than the Nash model; when 2ρ1 ≤ ρ2, cost sharing drops to zero.
Centralized decision-making consistently yields higher total supply chain profits than either decentralized mode, establishing the benchmark for efficiency loss.

Cite This Study

Ding et al. (2026) studied this question.

synapsesocial.com/papers/6a9d1eb628139818eab21ccd https://doi.org/10.3390/math14173196

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