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In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action‐guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre‐consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self‐transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self‐deception is possible. In Part II, I analyze the conditions of self‐deception, and discuss the grounds on which it is regarded as irrational, even when particular instances may be beneficial. I consider some of the classical analyses of the motives for self‐deception, and attempt to give an account of the occasions in which it is likely to occur. In the final section, I discuss the complex organization of the self that is presupposed by the phenomena of self‐deception.
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Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1972) studied this question.
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