Procreation and moral reasons: balancing prerogatives and harm

Is it permissible to bring into existence a person whose life is expected to be not worth living? Many philosophers say ‘no’, appealing to the harm suffered by the person who would be created. This paper argues that, in some cases, the answer may nevertheless be ‘yes’: creating such a person can be permissible, while refraining from creating her may be supererogatory rather than obligatory. Reasons arising from prospective parents – particularly the parental prerogative to have and raise children – can carry significant justifying force in procreative decisions. Whether such reasons can provide sufficient justification depends on the nature and seriousness of the harm involved. In the central cases this paper focuses on, prospective parents do not themselves impose harm by bringing a child whose life is not worth living into existence. Rather, their choice is a failure to benefit. This difference makes the moral reason against creating such a child less weighty.