Samuel Clarke on moral necessity and divine freedom

I identify three conceptually distinct operative notions of moral necessity in Clarke’s account of divine freedom. One notion of moral necessity is thin because it does not imply that God lacks the ability to choose to do otherwise; another notion of moral necessity is thick because it implies that God lacks the ability to choose to do otherwise, but God retains the power to do otherwise; and a third notion of moral necessity is robust because it implies that God lacks both the power and the ability to choose to do otherwise. After raising this exegetical puzzle, I provide a solution. I argue that Clarke’s conception of the will and account of divine omnipotence rule out the thick notion. The emerging picture is one in which God is (thinly and robustly) morally necessitated to do the best – and thus lacks the power and the ability to choose other than the best – but retains a meaningful ability to act otherwise, for God’s choice of creation is necessarily a choice between equally good options that God’s mere will can choose without any further reason.