Burn-Authorized Coding Jobs: Signature Binding, Replay Boundaries and Recoverable Off-Chain Execution

burnpr links an NFT burn and a signed repository/prompt request to an automated coding, GitHub and deployment pipeline. This report examines eight selected files at a fixed local Git commit. Five module syntax checks and thirteen isolated checks of selected source snippets passed. The thirteen include browser-script parsing and substitute receipt, signer-recovery, repository, state and filesystem dependencies; they do not integrate cryptography, GitHub, agent execution or deployment. The observations support message construction and selected rejection paths, while also showing that overlapping admissions can both pass replay checks, persistence is delayed, and a receipt with multiple matching burns selects the first. Source inspection further limits claims about secret isolation, mandatory pull requests and successful deployment. Public access to the configured source repository was not verified, and no software license was found in the inspected scope. The contribution is a reproducible account of an application composition and its authority boundaries. Human agency, financial inclusion and evidence-based accountability guide the evaluation; no measured social benefit, deployed harm or exclusive invention is established.Jarett Dunn. Technical report, version 1.0. Preprint, not peer reviewed. Codex assisted evidence recovery, analysis, local checks and writing. Empowerment, financial inclusion and evidence-based accountability guide evaluation; social outcomes are not measured. The manuscript and new analysis are CC BY 4.0; archived software retains its original license status and notices.