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The shifting tectonics of multipolarity, intensifying U.S.–China strategic competition, and acute regional volatility pose structural challenges to small-state diplomatic architectures. Existing scholarship extensively theorizes shelter-seeking and norm entrepreneurship within institutionalized Western contexts, yet the mechanisms through which non-Western small states leverage strategic non-alignment to navigate great-power rivalry remain undertheorized. This paper investigates Oman, asking: how do non-Western small states operationalize “active neutrality” to mitigate structural vulnerabilities at the intersection of global power transitions and regional polarization? Drawing on a qualitative single-case design combining formal process-tracing, including a priori hoop and smoking-gun tests with time-stamped evidentiary anchors, and systematically coded foreign-policy discourse analysis of Omani Ministry of Foreign Affairs communiqués (2020–2024), the paper argues that Oman transcends traditional bandwagoning and shelter-seeking through “facilitative hedging”: the deliberate construction of diplomatic indispensability through asymmetric mediation networks. Distinct from classical hedging, niche diplomacy, and structural-hole brokerage, facilitative hedging identifies an entrepreneurial mechanism whereby a small state generates switching-cost-based protection by rendering its intermediary function structurally necessary to competing great powers and regional antagonists simultaneously. The analysis examines three axes: U.S.–China economic-security balancing; Yemen conflict mediation and Red Sea de-escalation; and Gulf Cooperation Council institutional fragmentation. Diplomatic indispensability is operationalized through four measurable proxies—betweenness centrality in diplomatic event networks, backchannel exclusivity, third-party acknowledgment, and observable coercive restraint—applied across 2020–2024. The study contributes theoretically by refining small-state agency and engaging brokerage and protean-power literatures, and empirically by decentering Eurocentric assumptions in small-state theory. The Omani case suggests that multipolar instability can create opportunities for diplomatic indispensability within an increasingly transactional international order, with generalizable implications for small states in the Gulf, Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia, demonstrating how strategic neutrality can be converted from a defensive posture into an active mechanism of resilience, influence, and structural protection.
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Lotfi Sour (2026) studied this question.
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