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In this paper, I formulate a meta-ontological thesis concerning the relationship between Being, beings, and time. My central proposition is that Being is atemporal, whereas beings are temporal. I establish a conceptual distinction between the ontological status of Being and the temporal constitution of finite entities. Within this framework, I examine four interconnected dimensions: the temporality of beings, the existential temporality of Dasein, the temporal structure of ontological disclosure, and the atemporal status of Being. I understand time as a constitutive dimension of finite existence and as the horizon through which Dasein encounters and interprets Being. This distinction establishes a philosophical framework in which temporality belongs to the existence of beings, while Being occupies an independent meta-ontological register. I develop this thesis as a contribution to the philosophical examination of existence, finitude, and ontological intelligibility.
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Morteza Niami (2026) studied this question.
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