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China's new energy vehicle (NEV) industry, after rapid expansion, is confronted with the predicament of growing output alongside squeezed profits. Its industrial profit margin dropped to 4.1% in 2025, a ten-year low, while vehicle manufacturing margins shrank to 1.5% in H1 2026. Price cuts launched by leading enterprises set off a chain reaction, trapping the sector in a prisoner's dilemma. This paper reviews NEV price competition and identifies its regional, continuous, transmissive and multi-dimensional evolutionary features. Drawing on the prisoner's dilemma game model and the "policy-technology-market" triple lock-in mechanism, it argues that the price war arises from firm gaming and institutional lock-in rather than supply-demand imbalance. A three-stage governance framework is put forward: short-term market regulation, medium-term unlocking of development paths, and long-term shift toward value-based competition. The study concludes that the industry can escape the price competition trap only by replacing price competition with value competition, supported by technological innovation, institutional improvement and global layout.
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Peihang Zhong (2026) studied this question.
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