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This article examines the dual dynamics of hope and despair in the evolving relationship between the United States and China, and their implications for Asia’s emerging balance of power. It argues that the relationship is best understood not as a linear movement towards either war or reconciliation, but as a condition of managed rivalry in which selective cooperation coexists with deepening strategic competition. It asks how the intensification of this rivalry is reshaping the strategic options of Asia’s smaller states, and argues that the rivalry raises the cost and complexity of hedging without foreclosing it, thereby connecting two literatures, on US-China rivalry and on Southeast Asian hedging, that have largely developed in isolation. Drawing on realist, liberal and hedging perspectives, and employing a qualitative, historical-analytical approach, the article traces the evolution of Sino-American relations from Cold War hostility through engagement to contemporary strategic rivalry, before analysing the relationship across five dimensions: the historical, economic, military-security, ideological-governance, and regional-institutional. It shows that the return of the Trump administration in 2025 has not altered the structural foundations of the rivalry but has transformed its expression: from the institutionalised “managed competition” of the Biden years to a more transactional pattern of coercive bargaining punctuated by a fragile trade truce. Cooperation persists in narrower forms, even as structural distrust continues to intensify around trade, technology, Taiwan, the South China Sea, alliance politics and the competing regional visions embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy. For Asian states, particularly ASEAN members that have long hedged between the two powers, intensifying rivalry is progressively narrowing the strategic space for ambiguity and active neutrality. The article concludes that Asia’s stability will depend not only on Washington and Beijing’s capacity to manage their competition responsibly, but also on the ability of regional states to preserve strategic autonomy amid the hardening contours of great power rivalry.
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Meng et al. (2026) studied this question.
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