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This article argues that Egypt’s regional posture amid the escalating confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States reflects neither indecision nor passivity that most existing analyses attribute to Cairo, but a calculated strategy of strategic restraint, selective engagement, and calibrated balancing aimed at preserving strategic autonomy while avoiding entrapment in an open-ended regional conflict. Drawing on alliance theory, balance of threat theory, and concepts of buck-passing and chain-ganging, and integrating Arabic and English primary sources alongside regional strategic assessments, the article demonstrates that the growing expectations of the Arab Gulf states for deeper Egyptian engagement increasingly collide with Cairo’s calculated effort to navigate between the twin dangers of under-balancing and over-balancing. For military and policy practitioners, the analysis identifies Egypt’s strategic red lines, assesses the limits of Gulf burden-sharing expectations, and examines the implications for US strategy and regional deterrence architecture in the Middle East.
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Ahmed Abozaid (2026) studied this question.
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