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From 11 September 2026, Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, the Cyber Resilience Act, requires manufacturers to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents. Directly applicable, the Regulation requires Member States to designate notifying and market surveillance authorities but not the recipient, which Article 3(51) defines as a CSIRT designated as coordinator pursuant to Article 12(1) of Directive (EU) 2022/2555, a separately transposed directive. Recent scholarship examines how the two instruments interact but treats that designation as given. This article asks what follows where it has not been made, has been made by an instrument of different normative rank, or cannot be ascertained from national law. Applying doctrinal analysis to both instruments, and a functional comparison of four Member States’ instruments published in official sources to 11 September 2026, it finds four designation techniques, inconsistent use of the designation formula, and a dependency extending through Article 16(3) into the Regulation’s own enforcement architecture. The arrangement is lawful. The coordinator first appears as addressee in the Council’s negotiating mandate, and the legislative record contains no assessment of the consequences for uniform application. Penalizing manufacturers for the effects of an absent or indeterminate designation would be difficult to reconcile with legal certainty.
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Tilen Gorenšek (2026) studied this question.
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