As the integration of FPGAs into cloud computing platforms accelerates, the risk of fault injection attacks - especially through power-wasting designs - becomes increasingly critical. Malicious tenants can upload FPGA designs that, under specific input stimuli, generate excessive power consumption, jeopardizing the integrity of the shared power delivery network (PDN) and enabling denial-of-service or side-channel attacks. Traditional detection techniques relying on netlist and bitstream analysis struggle with generalization and can be evaded through circuit obfuscation and seemingly benign designs. In contrast to these netlist-based approaches, we introduce Timekeepers, a novel detection method that utilizes Standard Delay Format (SDF) timing data combined with machine learning to detect anomalous power behavior in synthesized FPGA designs. Our method trains a decision tree classifier on SDF files generated from both benign and malicious designs, focusing on timing characteristics such as propagation delays and setup/hold violations to identify power wasters at the primitive level. By abstracting away from circuit connectivity and emphasizing timing patterns, our framework is both scalable and robust across different FPGA architectures. The classifier independently evaluates each FPGA component and aggregates the results using a threshold-based voting system to improve detection granularity and reduce false positives. Timekeepers achieves 99.6% accuracy and demonstrates superior performance compared to state-of-the-art solutions. Furthermore, our approach is platform-agnostic and does not require access to netlists or bitstreams, preserving intellectual property confidentiality while enhancing pre-deployment security checks.
Fathy et al. (Mon,) studied this question.
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