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In this paper, I begin by introducing the idea of complete-life egalitarianism, pointing at the need to define it, to justify it, and to specify its implications for age-based practices.I then discuss two points of disagreement with Bidadanure's account of justice between age groups.The first claim is that while it makes sense to add constraints of justice between age groups that are irreducible to complete-life egalitarian concerns, sufficiency constraints should not be as extensive as Bidadanure proposes.I also illustrate the possibility of nonsufficiency constraints, through the idea of revisability.While my first claim accepts the incompleteness of the complete-life view, my second claim defends the potential of the completelife view itself in relation to efficiency.The idea is that a properly construed complete-life "egalitarian" account is capable of incorporating efficiency considerations without them being an add-on.Such efficiency constraints are essential to the potential justification of some of our key age-based practices.It remains an open question whether such differences in theoretical framing with Bidadanure's own account are likely to make a difference in practice.
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Axel Gosseries (2024) studied this question.
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