Incapability or Contradiction? Deguchi’s Self-as-We in Light of Nishida’s Absolutely Contradictory Self-Identity

Deguchi’s Self-as-We aims to vindicate a holistic conception of self by working out the implications of what it is to be an agent in light of the East Asian tradition. This is reminiscent of the late Nishida’s philosophy, which also presented a holistic notion of self by way of explicating the logical structure of the world in which subjects are fundamentally agents. Despite these basic resemblances, however, their overall outlooks are markedly different. What are the essential differences? We shall identify them as rooted in the metaphilosophical dimension and suggest that these can best be captured in terms of the role of contradiction . Deguchi’s approach is constructive and parsimonious in that he starts with his thesis of fundamental incapability and builds up his system by adding only those theses strictly necessary to propound his system. For this reason, Deguchi remains silent as to whether reality itself is contradictory. By contrast, Nishida’s attempt is foundational because its concern is the logical form of poietic reality, which, according to Nishida, is contradictory. Notwithstanding the virtue of metaphysical parsimony, we suggest that Deguchi might benefit from revisiting Nishida’s approach – particularly the role of contradiction therein – to lend greater cogency to his axiological proposals.