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This essay will argue systematically and from a historical perspective that there is something to be said for the traditional claim that the human and natural sciences are distinct epistemic practices. Yet, in light of recent developments in contemporary philosophy of science, one has to be rather careful in utilizing the distinction between understanding and explanation for this purpose. One can only recognize the epistemic distinctiveness of the human sciences by recognizing the epistemic centrality of reenactive empathy for our understanding of rational agency, that is, by emphasizing the psychological component in the concept of understanding that nineteenth-century philosophers like Droysen, in contrast to twentieth-century hermeneutic philosophers, still acknowledged. In addition, the essay will show in detail that merely pointing to the fact that narratives have a cognitive function in the domain of the human sciences, as is common among philosophers of history, does not provide us with a sufficient demarcation criterion for distinguishing between the human and natural sciences. Notes 1. For various aspects of the historical debate about the distinction between understanding and explanation see the essays in Feest (Citation2010). 2. For a succinct summary of the empiricist critique of the concept of understanding, see also Abel (Citation1948). 3. For an early exception to the general low regard of understanding in analytic philosophy of science, see Friedman (Citation1974). 4. To be fair, Mink seems at times a bit ambiguous about the claim of whether or not the configurational mode of comprehension is unique to the human sciences or whether it can also be found in some natural sciences like biology (see Mink, Citation1998, p. 130). 5. In contrast, David Velleman (Citation2003) suggests that the essence of a narrative lies in its ability to initiate and resolve structured cadences of emotions in the audience. Narrative understanding is achieved by our ability to relate the events in the story to a "familiar pattern of how things feel". I tend to agree with Carroll (Citation2007) that reference to such emotional cadences only allows us only to distinguish between interesting or boring narratives (see also Currie, 2010, Ch. 2). Nevertheless, it is an interesting question why it is that those narratives that resonate with us emotionally seem to be particularly interesting to us, why it is that we find those stories particularly important to write down or important to share with others. I suspect that narratives resonate emotionally with us for two reasons: First, it has to do with the fact that narratives invite us to take up the perspectives of the agents depicted in the narrative. Second, they resonate because they depict the actions of others in a morally salient manner activating our own moral judgment and moral emotions. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to address this important question here. It will have to wait for another occasion. 6. For a discussion of MacIntyre's view see also the insightful remarks by Uebel (this issue & forthcoming). 7. This should however not be understood as implying that I adopt a non-causal account of reasons. Au contraire, I continue to conceive of reasons as causes. See my forthcoming "Explaining human agency: Reasons, causes, and the first person perspective". 8. We thus experience a case of imaginative resistance. For a more detailed analysis of this phenomenon see Stueber (Citation2011). 9. The argument that I have outlined here does have obvious applications for a defense of simulation theory against objections by so-called narrativist positions in the theory of mind. For a brief outline of that position, see particularly Gallagher and Hutto (Citation2008). I have concentrated here on the topic of narratives as it has been discussed mainly in the philosophy of history, but not only for reasons of space. I also find that philosophers of history have been more specific about how exactly they conceive of the nature of narratives and their epistemic functions. I have directly addressed the narrativist challenge in contemporary theory of mind in Stueber, in press a & b. 10. Among twentieth-century philosophers of history, R. G. Collingwood and his follower William Dray constitute the exception in this respect. For my interpretation of Collingwood see Stueber (Citation2002). 11. This article has benefitted from discussions at the conference on Current Topics in the Philosophy of Human Sciences (TU Berlin, 2010), the meeting of the Society for the Philosophy of History at the APA Pacific Division conference (San Francisco, 2010) and the conference of the MacIntyre Society (Providence College, 2011). I also would like to thank Uljana Feest for her helpful comments on the penultimate draft.
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Karsten R. Stueber (2012) studied this question.
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