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The philosophy of agency has accomplishised a good deal of work on the notion of agency. In mostly focusing on deliberated, human agency, though, little has been done to understand agency as a general phenomenon, beyond the human: what kinds of agents are there and what kinds of things may qualify as agents? In this spirit, I will advance a general taxonomy of agents, thereby including fully-formed rational human agents all the way to more thermostats or riots. I will use this conceptual framework to argue that biological agency is intrinsically superior to artificial agency, both collective and automated. In Section 2, I will introduce a notion of agency based on a development of Searle's theory of intentionality. In Section 3, I will define three levels of agency: active, reactive, and proactive; based on that, I will present a taxonomy of agents with three kinds of agents – natural, collective, automated – classified through varying degrees of agency. Finally, in Section 5, I will discuss the limits of non–human agency, precisely arguing against the existence of collective and artificial persons. If granted, this has important implications in that human agency would enjoy systematically superior agential dispositions than artificial agents.
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Emanuele Martinelli (2025) studied this question.
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