Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
This paper articulates the Problem of the Infinite Regress of Ends , a neglected difficulty in the theory of practical reason. Philosophers commonly hold that rational action must be justified by an end as its reason. Yet for that end to function as a reason, it seems that the end itself must be justified by a further end as its reason, giving rise to an apparent regress. I argue that this regress results from two seemingly compelling principles: No Arbitrary Ends and No Circular Ends . Each principle is required by the nature of practical reasoning, but together they entail that there must be an infinite regress of ends in the course of action justification. However, I show that the very nature of practical reasoning also implies that the order of action justification cannot extend infinitely. Thus another principle, No Infinite Regress of Ends , holds, and it is inconsistent with No Circular Ends and No Arbitrary Ends. Furthermore, the same underlying structure that supports No Infinite Regress of Ends also supports No Arbitrary Ends and No Circular Ends. The resulting trilemma reveals that any adequate account of practical reason must explain how justification can terminate without arbitrariness or circularity.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Kyoungmin Cho (2026) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: