Answers are grounded in this paper and cite their sources.
The article presents a methodology for the research of cleavage structure in post-Soviet Russia on the regional level (municipalities as cases). This methodology is applied to the results both of the 2011 Duma election and elections to regional legislatures over the period 2012–14. The electoral cleavage map of today's Russia is constructed on the basis of the 2011 election results. All Russian regions are divided into five groups by the degree of their political competitiveness: (1) the least competitive group of six North Caucasian republics; (2) the group of four regions with the single ‘authorities versus community’ electoral cleavage (Mordovia, Mari El, Tatarstan and Tyumen oblast); (3) the ‘under-competitive’ cluster of 19 regions (including Adygea, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, Tuva, Belgorod, Bryansk, Voronezh, Kemerovo, Orel, Tambov and Ulyanovsk oblasts); (4) the ‘average’ cluster of 31 regions (including Moscow) and (5) the most competitive cluster of 20 regions (including Saint-Petersburg). It also concludes that the 2012 ‘party reform’ led to the ‘entropy’ of electoral preferences, an augmentation of political space dimensions and indirectly, a growth in the number of electoral cleavages in elections to regional legislatures (2012–14). It is recognized that in some regions the level of political competition has really increased, but the reason was not the appearance of new participants, but relaxation of administrative pressure on the strata depending on the state support. In these regions, especially in ethnic republics, not so much a liberalization of the electoral process but inter-clan conflicts took place.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Yury Korgunyuk (2015) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 10 related papers. Consider them for comparative context: